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This thesis examines the main purpose for establishing the AGCC, and proves
that it was not created just as a defensive alliance as it is generally perceived in the
West. The AGCC was formed for cooperation in all fields among its Member States.
To demonstrate this fact, this thesis discusses the historical events that led to the
establishment of this organization and analyzes the cooperation of the member states
in area of politics, security, economy, as well as the development of human resources.
The analysis indicates that the formation of the Shura Council (Consultative
National Councils) was the first step in the right direction in building suitable political
institutions. They allow the citizens of the AGCC to participate in the decision
making process. Also, the thesis examines the external and the internal threats to the
region and the AGCC relations with the West. It finds that the AGCC States must
enhance the existing (Gulf) Island Shield Force and maintain its alliance with the
West.
The Study examines the economies of the AGCC States and shows that the
AGCC States are still largely oil-based economies. It suggests additional and
aggressive economic diversification programs which are needed and essential to base
the economies on sustainable resources. The AGCC State must maximize an use oil
returns to diversify their economies away from oil. Additionally, the thesis discusses
the human resources development and emphasizes the investment in human capital
which should be the objective and the priority of the AGCC States. Also, the thesis
suggests that the educational system of the AGCC States needs radical reforms to
meet the demands of modern economy. Finally, the thesis provides general
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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 1981, six Arabian Gulf States (see Appendix C) - Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.),
bordering on the Arab Gulf bound together and formed a regional organization
called "The Arab Gulf Cooperation Council" (The AGCC). The heads of the
member states signed the Charter of the AGCC in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the
U.A.E.
Is theAGCCjust a security organization as it is generally perceived in the
West, or is it an organization for cooperation in allfields? Most of the limited
writers who focus on the AGCC emphasize that the establishment of the organiza-
tion is based on security matters.
This thesis examines the main purpose for establishing the AGCC, and
proves that it was not created just as a defensive alliance as it is generally
perceived in the West. The AGCC was formed for cooperation in all fields among
its member states. To demonstrate this fact, this thesis discusses the historical
events that led to the establishment of this organization and analyzes the coopera-
tion of the member states in the area of politics, security, economy, as well as the
development of the human resources. Finally, the thesis provides general recom-
mendations to strengthen the AGCC and move it forward in the future.
The six states share close similarities which are very important for the
success of any organization. There is the common language, Arabic, a common
religion, Islam, closely comparable social structures, roughly the same standards of
economic development, a collective culture, heritage and history, very similar
system of governments, and shared geography.
Also, there are similar economic, political, social and security challenges.
Perhaps among the most important factors in the composition of the AGCC, the
people of the six nations recognize and understand their fraternity in the wider
implications ofArab nationality. 1 Although the AGCC was established in 1981,
the common qualities had been in existence for centuries, and therefore,
cooperation among these states and the coordination of their effort on a regional
level had been in existence for many years. However, the cooperation and the
coordination lacked the formal regional entity to organize, unify and direct the
effort toward the attainment of the common goals.
A. WHY WAS THE AGCC CREATED?
Many people and organizations in the West perceive the AGCC as a
security organization with primary goals of military cooperation. This is due
largely to the circumstances and the timing in which the AGCC was created. By
the end of the 1970s, three main events radically transformed the stability of the
Gulf States and brought the similar defense outlooks of the Arab Gulf States in
sharp perspective. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, and
the Iran-Iraq War would not only impel the Arab Gulf States to forge closer
defense ties, but also would put the Gulf at the center of super-power competition. 2
Also, it is true that the Arab Gulf States in view of the Iranian revolution, the
Soviet invasion to Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War were presented with
unprecedented defense challenges. The severity of the situation by the end of 1980
and the acute regional instability caused by the above major events, serve to
accelerate the movement toward the formalization of defense cooperation in the
AGCC structure.
However, the above three events were not the only reasons for creating the
AGCC. The AGCC was created for cooperation and integration in all fields and
not just for security. Actually, the road to the AGCC started many years ago. A
diplomat from a AGCC State has stated that the origins of the movement toward
GulfArab cooperation reach back to 550 B.C. 3 It is certain for two decades prior
to the establishment of the AGCC there was strong sense of the need for
cooperation among the Gulf States and perhaps even unity of at least among the
smaller ones. For example, a successful attempt was made in 1971 when U.A.E.
got independence. The seven Emirates got together and formed the U.A.E. as we
know it today. Also, there was another attempt in 1971 to expand this Federation
to include Bahrain and Qatar. But eventually, as the leaders got down to serious
business the ideal of unity fell victim to particular interests.4 The negotiation
foundered for number of reasons. The key among other causes was the inability to
agree over the allocation of seats in the proposed Federal Council.
Unity was important at that time, because when Qatar got fully independent
in 1971, there was some initial opposition to that State's admission to the United
Nations. The hesitation was quickly overcome by the effort of the United States,
United Kingdom and other friendly countries in the United Nations. Certainly, the
Arab Gulf States have done well in making their way individually in the world.
But for all their progress, these nations with the exception of Saudi Arabia and
Oman still suffer from a weakness beyond individual state remedy, e.g., tininess
and small population. Of course, population has grown rapidly over the last three
decades but it is still very small, which poses the further question of long-term
viability of such small nations without grouping into regional organization, such as
the AGCC. 5
The people of the GulfArab States embrace Arab nationalism in its broader
meaning and find satisfaction in dedication to the Arab cause. However, by the
early 1960s it was fairly clear that the Arab League was about as far as the "Arab
unity" was likely to go in creating an all-inclusive political institution.6 Moreover,
the most vocal advocates ofArab unity at that time were Nasserists, Baathists and
the Arab National Movement. They were painting a vision of a New Social order
which was hardly inspiring to the conservative and prosperous citizens and the
ruling families of the Arab Gulf States. Thus, the search by the Gulf leaders for a
political identification started to focus close to home. From the beginning,
however, the quest for the sort of cooperation represented by the AGCC has been
perceived by the questers as compatible with and complementary to a dedication to
Arab Nationalism and the Arab League common goals. 7
There had been many initiatives before establishing the AGCC to
coordinate cooperation in the region. In 1976, H.M. Sultan Qaboos bin Said,
Sultan of Oman, made an initiative and invited the foreign ministers of the Arab
Gulf State; Iran, and Iraq to meet in Muscat to discuss the Oman suggestion that a
coordinated regional security and defense policy be established. The Ministers
were not able to agree on a common position and the conference came to an end
without any conclusion reached. 8 The Omani initiative could have been successful
in decreasing tension in the area and probably avoiding the two Gulf Wars, which
have happened since then in the region and involved directly three members of the
proposed organization.
Also, in 1976 another effort was made by Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah,
the present Amir, at that time was Crown Prince and Prime Minister of Kuwait.
Sheikh Jaber proposed the establishment of a "GulfUnion" involving the Arab
States in the region. The proposed GulfUnion was intended to be a vehicle for
joint action with the objective "of realizing cooperation in all economic, political,
educational and informative field."9 Now it is clear that the genesis of the present
AGCC was laid in the Kuwaiti proposal, although it was another five years before
the idea became a reality. Even though the concept of a GulfUnion was accepted
by all leaders, a lot of effort and time were needed for discussion on the subject of
the regional grouping, now refined in concept, to include only the six countries
which eventually formed the AGCC. 10
It was not easy for the AGCC leaders to establish the AGCC without
considering other powers in the region, especially in the field of security. Iran and
Iraq were and still are major powers in the Gulf. How could we talk of "Gulf
cooperation" without including Iran? And how could we talk about "GulfArab
Cooperation" without including Iraq?, with a population equal to that of the other
six Gulf States put together and a strong army. 11 The initiative ofH.M. Sultan
Qaboos in 1976 for Gulf Security Conference proved the point. Through trial and
error and serious thinking the Gulf leaders began to find a way to more structured
cooperation among the Arab Gulf States without upsetting or causing great
opposition from their neighbors. Eventually, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in
September 1980 provided a way around this obstacle. The AGCC is an exclusive
grouping of Gulf nonbelligerents. 12
The Arab Gulf States had a good common ground for economic cooperation
before the official establishment of the AGCC. Some major progress was made in
cooperative ventures among several of the six states. The most striking example
was the participation of Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E. and Oman in Gulf Air. Gulf Air
was not only a successful venture but also a facilitator and symbol of cooperation
among the four lower Gulf States. In the period 1976-78, GulfArab governments
got together to launch various commercial and industrial joint ventures. All six
plus Iraq participated in the Gulf Port Union, the Gulf Organization for Industrial
Consulting and the GulfNews Agency. By 1980 the Gulf Federation of Chambers
of Commerce and Industry was established. Thus major steps toward economic
cooperation were achieved well before the AGCC's Unified Economic Agreement
was approved in 1983. Therefore, most of the groundwork was done, the benefits
of working together were realized and the foundation was laid on which the AGCC
could be rapidly erected once the AGCC was officially created in 1981.
The driving force behind the establishment is not based on merely a series
of intellectual conceptions and conclusions, but is grounded in hard, material fact
which in turn, creates many of the AGCC strategic and geopolitical policies. 13 A
key element in the fact of the AGCC's life is the members awareness that only in
combination do they possess a proper viability as a political and demographic
independent entity in today's world. Individually, four of the six AGCC countries
are, in population and territory, extremely limited. Only Saudi Arabia and Oman
have a sizeable land mass on the world scale and none of the six has, individually,
a population of any magnitude. 14
B. THE CHARTER OF THE AGCC
The principal instrument of the AGCC is the Charter. 15 The Charter
consists of a preamble and 22 articles (see Appendix A). The preamble points out
three main points. First, it sets out the desire of the six member states to
strengthen their common links through cooperation, coordination and integration.
Second, it defines and emphasizes that cooperation and integration will serve the
long term interest of the Arab Nations. It complies with the Charter of the Arab
League, which calls for closer relations and stronger bonds among Arab States. 16
Third, the Preamble calls for cooperation in "all fields" which could be interpreted
that cooperation is not limited to those areas specifically mentioned in the Charter
articles.
The 22 Articles divided into six topics: 17
1
.
Basic information Articles (1, 2, 3, 5).
2. Objectives Article (4).
3. Structure Article (6).
4. Functions of the main body within the AGCC Articles (7-16 and 18).
5.
Privileges and immunities Article (17).
6. Charter implementation, amendment and disposition Article (19-22).
The AGCC Charter establishes three permanent bodies and one ad hoc
commission (Article 6). They are the Supreme Council, the Ministerial Council
and the Secretariat. The commission is a recommended body only and operates at
the pleasure of the Supreme Council (Article 10, Section 4). Voting in both the
Supreme and Ministerial Councils is based on unanimity on substantive issues and
on a majority for procedural matters (Articles 9 and 13). The Supreme Council
meets annually. Special sessions may be called if requested by any member and
seconded by another (Article 7). The Supreme Council is the highest body in the
AGCC and it consists of the heads of six member states.
The Ministerial Council consists of the foreign Ministers of the six member
states. The Council meets every three months, and its Presidency rotates in
alphabetical order of the member states (Article 11).
The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General and sufficient staff to
carry out the functions of the council. The staff must be citizens of the member
states (Article 14). The Secretariat is located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The
Secretary-General is the Chief Administrator of the AGCC. 18
C. THE OBJECTIVES




To achieve cooperation among the member states in all fields as a
prelude to unity.
2. To strengthen the links of cooperation among the people of the
member states in different fields.
3. To establish similar systems among the member states in all fields,
including economics and finance; commerce, customs and communi-
cation; education and culture and legislation and administration.
4. To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of
industry, mineralogy, agriculture, and marine and animal resources.
Also, to establish common projects, and encourage the cooperation
of the private sector for the common good of the people of the
member states. 19
An analysis of Article four leads to answer the primary question of this
thesis. "The AGCC is not just a security organization but an organization for
cooperation in all fields." It is interesting to note that cooperation in the area of
security is not even mentioned as being among the basic objectives ofthe AGCC.
None ofthe six specific areas ofcooperation under paragraph three ofArticlefour
touches on security. 20 Security was regarded as a sensitive issue. Therefore, the
leaders of the AGCC tried to avoid establishing a defensive alliance or perceived
to be a threat against anyone in the area. They emphasized that the objectives of
10
the organization were mainly economics. Also, Article four provides the
foundation for further cooperation in all fields which clearly includes security.
The AGCC States had different views on the issue of security. Oman for
example, wished to include security in the basic objectives of the AGCC, but
went along with the wishes of the majority of the AGCC States. In 1983 however,
the AGCC began to discuss security issues openly. I am not suggesting that
security issues were not discussed before this date, but I'm saying that, they
merely were not on the official agenda. Security matters have been the
preoccupation of all AGCC leaders with different degree of urgency.
This thesis is written to provide wide prospective about the formation and
the objectives of the AGCC, which is not limited to security cooperation.
Therefore, in the second chapter, I will discuss the political cooperation, the
formation and the roles of the Shura Councils in the AGCC states. In the third
chapter, I will address the security alliance by examining the internal and external
threats and the collective AGCC states defense plans. In the fourth chapter, I will
examine the economic cooperation and the achievements and the limitations of the
AGCC Unified Economic Agreement (UEA). Also, in this Chapter I will discuss
the achievements and the challenges of the human resource development in the
AGCC states. Finally, the thesis seeks to provide a conclusion of the main points
11
discussed in various chapters, and provide recommendations to promote and
enhance AGCC's achievements and defeat its challenges.
12
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II. THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
A. OVER VIEW OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
One of the main factors that all the AGCC states share together is the
similarity of the political system. All the AGCC states are ruled by ruling families
(monarchies). The structure of the governments is almost the same, where the
supreme executive, legislative and judicial authority is vested in the central
government. ' The legal system in the AGCC states reflects significant number of
shared features, including the shared heritage of Islamic law. Also, the AGCC
states implement similar policies in their foreign relations with the rest of the
world.
In examining the political system in the AGCC states, it is clear that several
essential conditions are present to enable the AGCC states to form lasting political
cooperation, which may lead to political integration in the future. I'm encouraged
by the fact that the Arabian Gulf region had witnessed two successful integrations
in the past. The first one was the unification of the Saudi Arabia by the late king
Abdullaziz, founder of the kingdom of modern Saudi Arabia; the second one was
the unification of the seven Arab Emirates, now known as the United Arab
Emirates (U.A.E.). These two experiences encourage the prospects for political
15
integration of the six Arab Gulf states since the previous successful integration
took place in the same region and among similar people.2
Having said that, I'm aware many things have changed in the region, which
makes it different from the past two experiences. At present, total integration
among sovereign states in the area is extremely difficult to accomplish. Other
types of integration such as economic integration seem to be easier to achieve,
simply because the independent countries would not have to surrender their
sovereignty, and that is why the AGCC states focus their effort more at this stage
on the economic and social integration, which are essential for any political
integration which must come at the final stage of any integration process.
The AGCC is a successful experience in the Arab world politics. It has
been able to overcome many serious challenges in the region. The most serious
one was the Iraq invasion to one of its members (Kuwait) on August 2, 1996. It
was a very difficult challenge and experience for the AGCC states, because the full
scale attack came from another Arab country which was unprecedented in the
modern Arab history. However, the AGCC states bound together and provided
unlimited political, economic, military, social and emotional support to Kuwait.
The forces of all the AGCC countries took active part in the liberation of Kuwait.
Without the enormous support of the AGCC states (especially Saudi Arabia), it
16
would have been almost impossible for the coalition forces, led by the US, to
liberate Kuwait.
The invasion of Kuwait had a great impact on the social and the political
system in the AGCC states. The AGCC countries experienced and developed a
new political approach, especially with relation between the governments and then-
people. This experience led the political elites to rethink their approach to politics
and seek more extensive domestic support and stronger foreign alliances. Also,
the Gulfwar provided the incentive and the will to get the people more involved in
the decision making process. As domestic, regional and international variables
continue to have great impact on the Arabian Gulf, the AGCC states are being
forced to deal with the issue of political participation more seriously than have in
the past. 3
This fact was clearly demonstrated in the increase of the popular participa-
tion in the decision making process in the AGCC states, coupled with the
formation ofnew political institutions in the form of (Shura Councils) and the
expansion ofpower of these Shura councils. Additionally, most of the AGCC
states have published their written constitutions, which protect individual rights
and defines the relationship between the governments and the people.
One of the AGCC states (Oman) has taken the lead in allowing women as
full members in its Shura Council and it is expected that others will follow. Most
17
AGCC states have realized that since Gulfwomen constitute almost half of the
population, and they should be given real opportunities to take their rightful place
in society.4 Also, all AGCC states agree that real security could only be achieved
through political participation of their people and social justice.
The AGCC countries are probably some of the most financially and
commercially integrated states in the world capitalist system, exercising near total
hegemony over the Gulfs economic choices and developmental strategy. 5 On the
other hand, the AGCC states are characterized by their small size in both area and
indigenous population, large foreign labor force and still limited political partici-
pation in the decision making process.
First and the foremost, the AGCC States are aware that they cannot achieve
their goals without the individual governments allowing their people to enjoy more
individual freedom, academic freedom in the universities, and freedom of expres-
sion in the society at large.6 This notion has been clearly emphasized in the rulers'
public addresses and "meet the people tours" in case of Oman. The citizens of
these states must be brought more into the government process so that they can
feel part of the effort. Presently, from the governments' perspective, this issue
may be discomforting, but in reality, this is the only way that will provide a
meaningful debate of the nature and the future of the AGCC States.7
18
In analyzing the political participation in the AGCC States, it is necessary
to point out that the Arab Gulf States are better described as newly emergent post-
traditional States. The traditional institutions are deeply associated with the
Islamic and Arabic way of life. Compared with other Arab and third world
countries, they are well able to provide for the needs of their citizens, and in the
few short decades of oil-fueled modernization have been accompanied by a
significant degree of political development. The extent of such development
depends largely on the length of time the modern States have had to solidify and
evolve. 8
The Gulf States are ruled by different ruling families. The traditional pillars
of the ruling families' legitimacy were based on traditional power-sharing in a
tribal society and Islam as represented in Islamic law. Historically, the leader of
the tribal community essentially serves as a "Chairman" rather than a ruler, who
consulted tribal, religious and merchant notables of the community before taking
action. Rulers also found it necessary to govern in accordance with, or at least in
reference to, the Islamic principles of consultation (Shura) and consensus (Ijma).9
B. THE SHURA COUNCILS
All AGCC States attempted to marry traditional and rationalist bases of
legitimacy by establishing advisory or Consultative Councils (Majlis Al-Shura).
19
They were the logical choice. Majlis represents the form of the institution and the
Shura its constitutional essence. Majlis is widely used for a parliament throughout
the Islamic world. Traditionally, the Majlis is a place where relatively free
exchange of ideas and opinions on a wide variety of social, political and economic
matters are discussed and debated. Also, the Majlis is an open meeting where
anyone can petition their leaders from the King down to the Governors of the
provinces and local leaders. In other words, the leaders are accessible to the
people. 10
The ruling families in the AGCC States are the ruling elites, and it is
generally accepted within tradition and tribal context to exercise authority in the
name of the people. Members of the ruling families are under the same obligations
and constraints as are all citizens, although this remains subject to abuse so that the
ruling families continue to monopolize power. The rest of the people will tolerate
this monopoly only as long as they continue to perceive the monarchical system as
legitimate and accept the authority of these ruling families. 11
Table I below shows a summary of the member states of the AGCC and the
ruling families:
20
Table I. Summary of the AGCC Number States and the Ruling Families
Country Ruler Ruling Family Total Population Area
Bahrain Isa Bin* Sulman
(Amir)**
Al-Khalifa 550,000 694 km2
Kuwait Jabir Al Ahmed
(Amir)
Al-Sabah 2,000,000 17,818 km2
Qatar Hamed Bin Khalifa
(Amir)
Al-Thani 500,000 11,437 km2
Oman Qaboos Bin Said
(Sultan)
Al-Bu Saidi 2,000,000 312,000 km2
Saudi Arabia Fahd Bin Abdula ziz
(King)





Al-Nahyan 2,000,000 77,700 km2
*Means "son of **Means Prince 24, 050,000 2,750,649
Source: After Ref . J.E. Peterson, "The AGCC Steps Toward Political participation,"
CSIS, 1988, New York, p. 5.
The discovery of oil in huge quantities has changed the AGCC States and
their inhabitants. The oil wealth enabled the AGCC States to carry out explosive
developmental programs. Economic prosperity touched every facet of life in those
countries. The whole infrastructure for Social Services, public Services, and
industrial development was created in a few years. Demands for consumer goods
increased a thousand-fold within a decade. 12 There is no taxation of any sort, and
the assumption is made that when the State relies on taxation the question of
democracy becomes "Unavoidable issue."
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The AGCC countries are no longer traditional tribal societies, and ruling
families increasingly risk being perceived as an elitist class, acting on their own
without political participation from the majority of the people, in the decision
making process. 13 The AGCC states consist basically oftwo societies;
conservative, which is a traditionalist that resists changes and demands adherence
to Islamic law, and liberal which demands more political participation in
governments. The political participation can be defined as a "process whereby
individuals engage in activity that impinges directly upon the national power and
authority structure of society." 14 By their written constitutions the AGCC States
describe themselves as democratic, implying a commitment to political
participation. 15 However, the term democracy is very limited compared to the
Western-style democracy.
There is little reason to suppose that the ruling families in the AGCC States
will be transformed into Western-style parliamentary or presidential democracies
in the foreseeable future. 16 Western-style democracy will not work in the AGCC
States. Therefore, the AGCC States wisely have chosen the Consultative Councils
(Majlis Al Shura) or Advisory Councils as a first step toward a limited democracy
which is the most suitable for these type of societies, because it satisfies the needs
and addresses the concerns of both societies. The official establishment of the
National Councils has enhanced the tribal or the social democracy that existed in
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all AGCC States. Also, this enabled the AGCC states to persuade both societies to
accept the National Council (Shura Councils) as a means for limited political
participation in the decision making process.
Now I will provide a brief background of the National Councils (Shura
Councils) in each State.
1. Saudi Arabia
The consultative council (Majlis Al Shura) in Saudi Arabia is the youngest
council in the AGCC States. It was first announced in 1962 but was postponed,
because the society was not ready for political participation as well as the
unwillingness of the government to share the power with the people. Finally, King
Fahd announced the official establishment of the Consultative Council in March
1992. The Shura Council is composed of a Chairman and 60 members chosen by
the King from amongst scholars and men of knowledge and expertise. The
Council members are committed to serving the public interest, preserving both the
unity of the community and the entity of the State and the interests of the nation. 17
2. Bahrain
Bahrain is the second of the AGCC States that established a National
Assembly. On August 15, 1971, the Amir of Bahrain announced the official
establishment of the National Assembly. The Assembly was to consist of 22
elected representatives plus 20 additional members, including eight delegates
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appointed by the Amir and 12 members of the Council of Ministers. The first
election in Bahrain was held in December, 1972. 18 Although the National
Assembly lacked authority to prevent the government from enacting legislation
that Assembly members opposed, this situation did not impede policy debates.
The National Assembly was replaced with the Shura Council in 1993, to go
along with the titles of the majority of the political institutions in the AGCC States.
The New Shura Council expanded to 30 elected members with greater authority. It
is important to point out that the National Assembly was suspended by the Amir in
1975, because of the Assembly's opposition to the government decision to enact a
new security law as well as the prime minister's threat to resign, as he could not
work with the National Assembly. 19
3. Kuwait
In June 1961, the Amir of Kuwait announced that he would establish a
constitution for Kuwait and a National Assembly. The National Assembly
consisted of 20 seats. The first election ever in the AGCC States was held in
Kuwait on December 30, 1961 . The National Assembly was then expanded to 50
elected members by secret ballot.20 Individual rights protected by the constitution
are extensive and include personal liberty and equality before the law, freedom to
hold beliefs and express opinions, and freedom of the press. The National
Assembly was changed to the Advisory National Council (ANC) before the
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invasion in 1990. After the Gulfwar the National Assembly was reinstated with
greater legislative power and responsibility. (It enjoys more legislative power than
any of the other Shura Councils in the AGCC states). The last general election for
the National Assembly was held on October 8, 1996. Many new representatives
were elected for the first time, who represent all groups of the Kuwaiti society,
including the Shea minority.21 Also, in Kuwait the National Assembly was
suspended twice by the Amir. The first suspension was in 1976. This was due to
the political dissension and the unregulated press. The second was in 1986, after
the National Assembly failed to observe the Amir warning in 1985, which pointed
out the necessity for practicing a reasonable democracy.22
4. Qatar
The Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura) is included in the constitution of
April 19, 1972.23 It consists of 30 members chosen for their good judgment and
competence to represent all sectors of society and all regions of the country. The
Shura Council debates the general policy of the State, the social and cultural
affairs, drafts laws proposed by the council ministers and discusses the draft
budgets of major public projects. In 1975 the Amir empowered the Shura Council
to summon individuals to answer questions on legislation before promulgation.
Amir Hamed bin Khalifa who deposed his father in June, 1995, has made
many reforms in the country since he has taken over, including the amendment of
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the provisional constitution. In addressing the Shura Council in November, 1996,
the Amir stated "We think that its time to draw a permanent constitution which
takes into account the progress which has taken place in the country in all spheres
during the last twenty-five years, to deepen our pioneering experience in popular
participation in such a manner as to reinforce the capacity of the executive,
legislative and judicial powers." The basics the Amir has introduced are regarded
by the Qatari people as a revolution bringing positive and radical changes to the
country. These reforms have enhanced the atmosphere of democracy in the state.
5. United Arab Emirates
The Shura Council is known as the Federal National Council (FNC). It was
established on February 13, 1972 and is considered a landmark in the country's
constitutional and legislative process.24 The FNC advises the Cabinet and the
Supreme Council but cannot overrule them. According to the constitution, the
FNC consists of40 members who are drawn proportionately from each of the
seven Emirates. Each ruler appoints the members for his Emirate.
The distribution of FNC is as follows - Abu Dhabi and Dubai eight
members each, Sharja and Ras Al-Khaimah six members each and Umm Al-
Qawain, Ajman and Fijairah four members each. The FNC has the power to
amend and review all legislation and summon ministers to review and criticize the
work of their ministries.25
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6. Oman
The State Consultative Council (SCC) was established on October 18, 1981,
the second youngest National Council in the AGCC. Initially, the Council was
composed of 43 members but was extended to 55 in 1983. All members were
appointed and the President of the SCC was directly selected by the Sultan. On
November 18, 1990 (National Day), H.M. the Sultan announced that the Shura
Council was to replace the SCC.26 The main difference was to be that whereas the
SCC was a nominated body, Shura Council was to be a wholly elected body. There
are 59 Wilayets (districts) throughout the country and all are represented. During
1994 H.M. the Sultan approved the expansion of the Shura Council from 59
members to 80 members based on the result of the first National Census held in
December 1993. Those Wilayats with a population ofmore than 30,000, elect four
candidates, and the government selects two members. Wilayets with less than
30,000 continue to put forward two candidates, one ofwhom is selected by the
government for a term of three years.27
The Sultan also decreed the participation ofwomen in the vote for the first
time and their right to be nominated for representation in the Shura Council. As a
result, two women now serve as representatives in the Shura Council. This was
the first time in the AGCC States history where women were elected as members
of the National Council. This action has been well received and supported in the
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Oman society. In an interview with the U.K. newspaper, the Daily Telegraph, the
Sultan said "There is no way women are inferior, they are equal to men in every
respect, and all my countrymen are getting hold of this now."
Additionally, H.M. the Sultan tried to bring in the newly-educated Omanis
by raising their social and political status and offering them significant economic
rewards.28 Among the principal duties of the Shura Council is the reviewing of all
social and economic draft laws, prepared by Ministries before their enactment.
The council also participates in setting up development plans, and in the following
up of their execution within the general strategy of the State.29
The Shura Council has the power to summon ministers to appear before the
Council when a matter concerning their ministry is discussed, and they must reply
on the spot to valid questions put by any member of the Council. The debate is
always televised live to the whole Nation, and has been well received by the
public.
H.M. the Sultan also carries on the democratic process through his annual
tours of the interior, "Meet the people tour." He usually stays out in the desert for
one month with many of his ministers. This provides him with the opportunity to
meet individual Omani face to face, listen to their suggestions and discuss their
problems, which gives him a valuable means of assessing their need and
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evaluating his developmental programs. On these occasions, the appropriate
ministers are called in and the matter is dealt with immediately. 30
During the 26th National day (18 November 1996) H.M. issued a royal
decree number 101/96 which established the first written constitution in Oman
history. 31 The constitution was named "The White Book," the basic law of the
Sultanate of Oman. It contains 81 Articles and deals with all aspect of the life in
Oman. The constitution is considered as a landmark in Oman after the country has
completed its basic infrastructure. The people of Oman received the constitution
with great pleasure and happiness, because it is viewed as a written commitment
from the government to the protection of individual rights which the people of
Oman enjoy now and would insure its continuation in the forceable future. Table
II illustrates a summary ofNational Councils (Shura Council) in the AGCC States.
Are formal National Councils (the Consultative Councils) appropriate for
these States? Or are these institutions basically Western imports with no legiti-
mate basis in Gulf Society? The latter does not seem to be the case. Instead, the
National Councils of the AGCC States is an attempt to transform traditional
informal institutions into modern formal institutions. These political
establishments are intended to legitimize the government and enable all sectors of
the citizens of the AGCC States for limited political participation in the State-
building process, especially, during a period of rapid development and difficult
destabilizing changes in both security and oil prices. 32
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Table II. Summary of the Shura Councils (National Consultative
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Source. After Ref. John E. Peterson, "The AGCC Steps Toward Political Participation,"
CSIS, New York, 1988, p. 24.
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C. THE ROLE OF THE SHURA COUNCILS
What are the roles played by the National Councils? In order to provide an
answer to this question, it is important to point out that there is a difference among
the National Councils in structure and authority, but overall, they all play similar
functions. John Peterson indicated six functions. These are summarized below:
1. Legitimization of the Government. A National Council is generally seen
as a democratic institution. It at least preserves the facade of constitutional
legitimacy and implies a "social contract" between the government and its
people.
2. Formalized Majlis (Council). It formalized the traditional informal
social Majlis in a formal, constitutional manner.
3. Legislative Role. Formal participation in the legislative process,
e.g., debating and reviewing government non-sensitive policies.
Questioning Ministers and representing the people.
4. Government Accountability. The written constitutions in most of
the AGCC States specify that sovereignty rests with the people.
Theoretically then, governments are accountable to the people.
Therefore, in a general sense, the legislative powers of these bodies
constitute a check on government policies and activities.
5. Incipient Populism. National Councils can provide an outlet for the
expression of opinion and grievances. They can act as a safety
valve. Members of the National Councils frequently adopted a
populist stance, speaking out on behalf of the "little guys." I have
seen it many times in Oman during the Shura Council sessions.
6. Legitimization of Political Participation by Minority. Ethnic
minorities have been represented in the various bodies in most
AGCC States, either through election by fellow members of their
communities or by the effort of the government to provide these
groups with representation. 33
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7. National Councils (Shura Councils) serve as a conduit for a
political participation in general.
In summary, the AGCC countries have made a good start in the right direc-
tion for enabling the people of the AGCC States to participate politically in the
decision-making process. The Shura Councils are the first blocks toward building
appropriate democracy in the AGCC States. The next step should be directed
toward expanding the legislative capacity of the Shura Councils and emphasizing
the democratic forms of governing through direct popular elections. The AGCC
States are ready for well-planned political development and political reform,
without much domestic and external pressures.
The AGCC is a relatively young organization, the first of its kind in the
Arab world. It has promise, but it faces challenges. Challenges could be met and
defeated by building strong political institutions and promoting democracy, where
the AGCC citizen can nurture his aspirations for a life of dignity and economic
prosperity.
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III. SECURITY
The security threats and the instability in the Arabian Gulf in the late 1970s
hastened the inception of the AGCC. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was the
opening stage of serious instability. The outbreak ofwar between Iran and Iraq in
1980 and the fear from the expansion of the war to nonbelligerent countries, and
the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan all exacerbated the instability in the region.
These events posed serious regional threats and set the stage for formal military
cooperation between the Arab Gulf States through the AGCC. At that time, the
leaders of the AGCC states placed a greater emphasis on economic cooperation
than military cooperation. Security was one of the major concerns of the leaders
but it was not the only objective of the AGCC. Actually, security was not even
included as one of the major AGCC objectives in Article Four of the AGCC
Charter. Because security was a very sensitive issue, and the AGCC leaders did
not want their neighbors to perceive the creation of this organization as a military
alliance.
The AGCC States established their defensive system on many dimensions
which included historical considerations, domestic constraints, regional political
and military conditions and the role and the interest of the superpowers in the
region. The above elements have resulted in establishing military alliance that is
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defensive in nature and based on limited though developing deterrence capacities. 1
The strategic interest of the AGCC States has always been in removing the region
from confrontation and defusing hostilities in the area. Due to the historical role of
external actions and interference of major powers in the region, the AGCC States
have been keen to build a credible defense capacity against other regional actors in
the area. There are many limitations and restrictions in personnel, training, as well
as other structural and geographical constraints. 2 The military capacity ofwhich
the AGCC States could develop in the past individually and collectively did not
match the enormous strategic importance of the AGCC States. The small popula-
tion of the AGCC States did not allow the formation of large armies or other labor-
intensive military structures to match the large populations and the standing armies
of Iraq and Iran.
In order to compensate for the lack of personnel, the AGCC States concen-
trated on obtaining sophisticated capital-intensive defensive weaponry from
foreign suppliers.2 However, this approach created another problem because the
corresponding pool of indigenous educated personnel was comparatively small in
light of the number of areas where modernization was necessary in order to create
and maintain modern military systems.
Having realized this shortcoming, all AGCC States invested generously in
human capital mainly in education and other related human development
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programs. At the same time, they were obliged to rely on foreign personnel to
train and assist in developing their indigenous military capacity. The risks
inherent in this trend were obvious and underlined the desire by the Arab Gulf
States to "nationalize" their military systems once sufficient indigenous skills have
been developed. 3 There are many other challenges of general relevance to the
strategic interests and development of military capabilities, including the
geographical characteristics of the AGCC States, such as protecting large
territories with a remote social and economic infrastructure, and the strategic
location of oil installations, most ofwhich are located on the Gulf or in the desert
and vulnerable to attack by sea and air. Attacks on key facilities could impair the
entire oil infrastructure, though efforts have been aimed at achieving a degree of
redundancy.4
A. The IRAN-IRAQ WAR, 1980-88
The outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran provided the first major
threat to the AGCC States. Full-scale warfare erupted September 10, 1980 as
Iraq's military units swept across the Shatt al Arab waterway which forms the
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers - into the province of Khuzestan,
Iran's richest oil-producing area. 5 This war presented the Gulf region with great
hostility and instability. Initially the AGCC States were affected peripherally, but
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as most of the AGCC States supported Iraq in this ill-fated war, the Iranians
reacted to the Iraqi air attack on its main oil terminal on the Island of Kharj by
attacking ships destined for ports in Gulf States that assisted Iraq in its war effort. 6
Also, during the war some of the AGCC States (Bahrain and Kuwait) accused Iran
in getting involved of destabilizing incidents, including an abortive coup in
Bahrain in 1981, terrorist activity in Kuwait in 1983, and violence in Mecca,
resulting in the death of more than 400 pilgrims. 7 As a result of these attacks on
the oil tankers, Kuwait sought the protection of the U.S. to escort its vessels in the
Gulf. The United States, determined to protect its interest in the region to ensure
the flow of oil, accepted to place Kuwaiti oil tankers under the American Flag.
Also, the British and Soviets took part in the re-flagging of Kuwaiti ships. Under
this arrangement, Kuwait succeeded in protecting its oil tankers and Iran generally
avoided interfering with Kuwaiti ships sailing under the major powers' protection. 8
The war lasted for eight years. Heavy losses were sustained by both countries
which included both human casualties and the destruction of main cities,
eventually forcing the Iranians to accept a United Nations cease-fire in August
1988.
B. THE GULF WAR, 1990-1991
Unfortunately, on August 2, 1990 another full-scale war was initiated in the
Gulf region by Saddam Hussein. But this time the war was a full-scale invasion
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against Kuwait, a member of the AGCC. This war presented the AGCC States
with immediate threats and a direct challenge to their survival and existence. All
AGCC States, and the whole world for that matter, were caught by surprise to
wake up in the morning ofAugust 2, 1990 and find that Kuwait was invaded and
ceases to exist as a sovereign state. The invasion of Kuwait was not only rejected
by the AGCC States, but was condemned by the entire international community
with the regrettable exception of a few Arab countries who felt that their moral
principles would be compromised and /or seeking vague economic advantages as
promised by Saddam. The Iraqi invasion of its small neighbor, Kuwait, was a
serious blow to Arab unity. It was an unprecedented event in the modern Arab
history and the most traumatic incident in the history of the Arab League.
It is ironic to remember that before the war, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen and Iraq
formed a short-lived Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) whose members then found
themselves on opposing sides after Saddam's invasion to Kuwait. The AGCC had
been unable to deter or prevent the forcible annexation of its member and the ACC
had failed to stop one of its members, Iraq, from the unilateral use of force in
realizing the ambitions of its leadership.9
Intelligence sources believed that, after Iraq completed its occupation of
Kuwait, it was positioning its forces for a subsequent drive toward the Saudi oil
fields and possibly continuing down toward other AGCC States. I personally did
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not agree with this analysis. It would not have been to Saddam Hussein's
advantage to swallow Saudi Arabia and other AGCC States. His lines of
communications would have been too thinly extended and his forces would have
been dangerously and vulnerably exposed to air and land attacks. Saddam's
subsequent drive to Saudi Arabia however was greatly exaggerated by the West.
Such exaggeration of threats was not necessary because the AGCC States were
totally committed to the liberation of Kuwait at any cost. The creditability of the
AGCC was under serious challenge. Also, if the occupation had been allowed to
continue, it would have set a serious precedence in the international relation and
many aggressors around the world would follow Saddam's approach in dealing
with their neighbors.
The U.N. issued a series of resolutions condemning Iraq. The Security
Council on August 2, called for Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal
from Kuwait. Again, to protect its interests in the region and as the only super-
power in the world, the United States took the lead and formed a coalition from 28
countries and deployed more than 600,000 ground, sea and air personnel to protect
Saudi Arabia and liberate Kuwait. The majority of the forces and military equip-
ment were provided by the U.S.
Command of the coalition forces was divided: Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf
headed the U.S., British and French Units; his Saudi counterpart, Lt. Gen. Khalid
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Ibn Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz, Al Saud, commanded units from 24 non-western
countries, including troops from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait and other
AGCC States. In addition to 20,000 Saudi troops and 7,000 Kuwaiti troops, an
estimated 3,000 personnel from other AGCC states took part in the land forces of
the Coalition Offensive, which was known as Operation Desert Storm. 10 On
February 28, 1991, although Kuwait was liberated yet another tragic phase of the
war had already begun, the suffering of the innocent Iraqi people.
C. EXTERNAL THREATS
Most of the external threats that precipitated the formation of the AGCC, in
1981, still exist today. In 1981, the AGCC didn't regard Iraq as a serious threat to
its security. Today, six years after the Gulf War, Iraq, despite its military defeat in
1991, still possesses the means to threaten the AGCC States as long as the Baath
regime and Saddam Hussein are still in power. Iran, with its revolutionary
idealogy, still poses a threat. Iran has softened its radical position to improve its
tarnished image in the international community, but it is still considered a threat
as long as it continues to occupy the three islands that belong to UEA and keeps
buying and developing offensive military capabilities.
1. The Arab- Israeli Conflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict was not really a pressing issue during the
previous Labor Government as the peace process was progressing toward an
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acceptable solution to all parties. Such solution must include a just,
comprehensive and permanent peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and the
realization of Palestinian legitimate rights of having a state of their own. The
present Israeli Government, under the Likud party and the leadership ofprime
minister Penjamin Netanyahu, are largely antagonistic toward the peace process
and unwilling to move forward with the peace agreement, rather wanting to
renegotiate the Oslo agreement, which may endanger the whole peace process.
Under such circumstances, the AGCC states regard Israel as a regional threat,
because the Palestinian question is the central issue in the Middle East. The
AGCC fully supports the peace process and with two of its members Oman, and
Qatar even moving forward with limited economic contact with Israel. But
presently, they have frozen all contacts with the present Israeli Government
because it has not honored the peace Agreement that was signed by the previous
Labor Government.
2. The Iranian Threat
The Persian threat to the Arab Gulf States goes back hundreds of years in
history. In the distant past, there have been many Persian invasions to the Arab
side of the Gulf. It was driven by a strong tradition of struggle in the region. It
was also the ambition of Iran, expressed earlier by Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi,
and then, more recently by Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors, to play the
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dominant role in the Gulf security. This along with the continuing occupation of
the three islands in the Arabian Gulf, the Iranian weapon acquisition programs, and
the suspicion which the Sunni Muslims on the Arab side of the Gulf have toward
the Shiite religious Imams who control Iran. Those factors are the main cause for
the confrontation. They created a psychological threat and mistrust between the
two groups.
Having said that however, the Iranians and the Arabs are neighbors and
have been living together for many centuries. They both contributed generously to
the Islamic Civilization and there has been strong economic and cultural coopera-
tion between Iran and the member States of the AGCC. The AGCC States regard
Iran as an important regional power but they do not want Iran to dominate the
region. The defeat of Iraq, in 1991, has altered the balance ofpower in the Gulf
region, and Iran's position was made clear by its religious leaders that: "As the
mostpowerful country in the region it is natural that we should be concerned
about the security and stability ofthe region... our proposalfor the seven regional
countries (Iran andAGCC) - as well as the eighth country Iraq ifthe right
conditions are present there - is to create the nucleus ofa system by which they
can, on their own, without the interference ofothers, restore security and
stability.
"n The AGCC States are suspicious about the intention of Iran and its
role in the security of the region. Yet the relationship between the AGCC states
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and Iran is not of open hostility. Oman for example, has relatively good links
with Iran, as they both share the responsibility of the Strait ofHarmuz. Oman has
always kept open links with Iran and mediated quietly between Iran and other
AGCC States. Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar exchanged ambassadors in December,
1990, (Bahrain has withdrawn its ambassador in protest to the recent internal
problems and its accusation of Iran of interfering in its internal affairs). Ties
between Riyadh and Tehran had been improving until they soured again during the
1993 Haj (Pilgrimage) after a disagreement over a demonstration planned by
Iranian pilgrims. 12 But since then, the links between the two countries have been
improving again, and it seems that the Saudis are ruling out the possibility of
Iranian involvement in Al-khubor bombing on June 23, 1995 that killed 19
Americans.
Despite the relatively improved relations between Iran and the AGCC
States, There are still many factors unfortunately that strain the relationships
between the AGCC countries and Iran. The AGCC States believed that Iran was
not only expressing political opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, but that
it was also financing operations to undermine it. Also, the AGCC States' concerns
about Iran's involvement in the internal subversion acts in some AGCC States
(Bahrain ) carried out by resident Iranian nationals. 13 Additionally, the AGCC is
very concerned about Iran's effort in building up its military capabilities, which
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Tehran announced and proceeded to carry out. It is convinced that this effort
involves the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the expansion of chemical and
biological weapons capabilities, the acquisition of more sophisticated missiles, and
the purchase of three modern diesel submarines from Moscow. 14 Iran denies that
its military capability is of offensive nature and argues that its arms build-up is
simply the restoration of the capabilities destroyed in the eight-year war, and
designed to protect the country from external enemies such as the U.S. Also, Iran
denies the support of subversion in the AGCC States or elsewhere abroad. On the
Arab-Israel dispute it says it represents the true wishes of the Muslims people who
mistrust Israel in the negotiations.
Finally, the main problem which continues to strain the relationship
between the AGCC and Iran is its occupation of the three islands ofAbu Mosa,
Greater Tumb and Lesser Tumb. These islands are claimed by U.A.E. The three
islands are strategically located at the mouth of Strait ofHurmoz in the Arabian
Gulf. They are all very small and Abu Mosa has a small amount of oil, while the
two Tumbs have none, but strategically they are very important for both
countries. 15
The U.A.E. has been working hard in politicizing and internationalizing the
issue of its claims of ownership. U.A.E. claims that they belonged to Emirates of
Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah prior to the formation of the U.A.E. and the Iranian
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"occupied" them by force in 1971 when the Emirates were weak. Iran adheres to
its official position that "these islands have always belonged to Iran; the British
took them in 1903 and gave them to the Emirates, but returned them to Iran in
1971. These islands are under Iranian sovereignty and ifothers do not accept this
reality that is their problem." 16 After the Gulf War, the U.A.E. broke a silence of
21 years and announced claims of ownership over all three islands after Iranian
authorities prevented more than 100 people of various Arab nationalities (mainly
teachers) from entering Abu Musa in April and September 1991. 17
The U.A.E. was very successful in drawing the Arab and world attention to
its claims. The AGCC issued many statements supporting the UAE's claims. The
Arab League has done the same and the U.A.E. officials have brought up the issue
in their annual addresses to the UN assembly. Also, the U.A.E. is willing to take
the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague. However, Iran is not
willing to accept this proposal and is even not willing to negotiate the "ownership"
of the islands. Iran normally issued very strong statements to U.A.E. claims; for
example after the December, 1992, AGCC Summit Meeting, Tehran declared that
if U.A.E. tried to take the island, it would have to "cross a sea of blood" to do so. 18
Also, the Iranian military presence on Abu Musa remains relatively high and
increased in times of tension. It has been confirmed that Iran has deployed
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Silkworm Missiles in Abu Musa recently; this action may increase the tension
between Iran and U.A.E.
In analyzing the islands' problem it is clear that U.A.E. and the rest of the
AGCC States did not intend to provoke a violent conflict in the region, but the
AGCC's ultimate political purpose is to send clear signals to Iran and other
potential aggressors, indicating that the AGCC states would not be intimidated by
any external threats. Remembering the Iraqi invasion of one of its members
(Kuwait) in 1990, and seeing Iran building its military forces and talking tough,
the AGCC leaders want to draw a line in the water to ensure that Iran or Iraq
would not try to encroach any further on AGCC states' territories. 19 Iran does not
want the AGCC states to request the assistance of the West to ensure their security
and stability. At the same time, its actions toward the AGCC States, including the
islands issue and its weapon acquisition programs, do not correspond to Iran's soft
and reconciling language that it has been using recently to obtain the trust of the
AGCC States. The AGCC States don't want talks - they want positive actions and
would like to see confidence building measures taken to reduce the tensions in the
region. Reaching a peaceful settlement on the issue of the islands, stopping the
interference in the internal affairs of the AGCC States, and reducing its military
offensive capability, would be a good start from the AGCC point of view.
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3. The Iraqi Threat
Today, after six years of the Gulf War, the AGCC States still consider Iraq
as a threat to their security. During the Iran-Iraq war the AGCC States provided
Iraq with financial and political assistance, considering that an Arab State fighting
a non-Arab neighbor. But when the war ended in 1988, the AGCC leaders had
become wary of Saddam's intentions, especially when Saddam Hussein took a
strong public position on oil policy and strongly criticized Kuwait and U.A.E. for
their policies toward oil prices.20
The AGCC States were hoping that the crushing military defeat of Saddam,
Hussein in 1991, would bring an acceptable and more friendly Iraqi government
that would respect the sovereignty of the AGCC States and help the Iraqi people to
get over the post-war problems. Unfortunately, this did not happen. Six years
later Saddam is still in power causing more security threats to his neighbors and
creating more human misery for his own people.
The AGCC States in particular are still concerned about possible Iraqi
aggression, since an unrepentant Saddam Hussein remains in power and the Iraqi
army still has a potential offensive capability of over 2,300 tanks, 4,400 armored
vehicles, 1,000 artillery pieces, 120 attack helicopters, 230 transport helicopters,
and 300 aircraft. In addition, the strength of the army was placed at some 382,000
men in active service, including four divisions of Republican Guards. 21
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Apart from the military threat, the Iraqi regime could utilize other methods
such as subversion or secret agents to destabilize the AGCC States. This is quite
possible, but it is unlikely at the present time, due to the severe economic,
political and internal security problems in Iraq, which pose a serious threat directly
to Saddam, his family, and the Baathiest regime. Also, Baghdad has tried to divide
the AGCC States by appealing to some states such as Qatar, U.A.E. and Oman and
focusing criticism on others such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. This technique has
not been very successful. TheAGCC States realize the long term impact of their
division, but they do have different points ofview on how to deal with Saddam's
regime. It must be clear that the AGCC States have no problems with the people
of Iraq, but their problem is with Saddam's regime. Actually, all AGCC States
have considerable sympathy with the innocent Iraq people, as fellow Arabs who
are suffering from the UN sanctions against Iraq. Some of the AGCC States have
called for lifting of the unjustified UN sanctions against the poor people of Iraq
who are paying the heavy price of Saddam's aggression.
Some people of the AGCC are blaming the United States for not solving the
problem, especially since it is the only superpower in the world. "Some AGCC
nationals even privately express their belief that Saddam has stayed in power
because the United States wants him there to keep Iraq weak and to serve as an
excuse to maintain a U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and to sell arms to rich
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AGCC States. Although this theory is doubtful, it is appealing because it is a
simple explanation for the complex phenomenon of Saddam Hussein's
extraordinary staying power." The AGCC leaders are really in a dilemma
regarding the situation in Iraq. They are distressed that the Iraqi people are
continuing to suffer with no end in sight.22 At the same time, they don't want to
ease the international pressure on Saddam's regime. The people of the AGCC
really hope for the downfall of Saddam Hussein to help the Iraqi people and
establish a new page with an acceptable Iraqi government.
D. INTERNAL THREAT
The internal threat to the AGCC States is even more serious than the
external threat. In this case, the internal threat to the security and the stability of
the AGCC countries comes from within the people of the AGCC States, through
subversion or through secret agents working within the societies. Also, the
internal threat includes the border disputes which is another source of irritation and
potential conflict among the AGCC States.
1. Territorial Disputes
The importance of defined boundaries came only after the discovery of oil
in the region. Before the oil era, the Arab Gulf States made very little effort to
delineate their territories. Arab tribes roamed across the Arabian Peninsula in
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search of the need of their flocks. The delineation of borders began with the
signing of the first oil concessions in the late 1930s.23 As was normal practice for
the British, they did not define the national boundaries clearly when they left the
area, but instead left many opportunities for future contentions among the AGCC
States. Most of the AGCC countries have settled their border disputes through
peaceful means or on the way to being settled peacefully.
2. Qatar-Bahrain Territorial Dispute
The most critical point of contention among the AGCC States is clearly
between Qatar and Bahrain. Qatar claims the island ofHuwar and the adjacent
small islands, and in return, Bahrain claims al-Zubarah on the northwest coast of
Qatar. This is a very old dispute, but was brought to the surface in the last decade.
The claims stem from former tribal areas and dynastic struggles of Al-Khalifa in
Bahrain and Al-Thani in Qatar. The simmering quarrel reignited in the spring of
1986 when Qatar helicopters removed and "kidnaped" workmen constructing a
Bahraini coast guard station on Fasht al Dibal, a reef off the coast of Qatar.24
Saudi Arabia mediated between the two countries and reached a short truce,
whereby the Bahrainis agreed to remove the construction on the island. In 1991,
the problem flared up again when Qatar decided unilaterally to take the issue to the
international Court of Justice in the Hague. Bahrain refused the jurisdiction of the
court.25
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Also, Bahrain staged an unprecedented boycott of the annual summit of the
AGCC which was held in Doha, in early December 1996. It was the first boycott
of a summit since the AGCC was formed in 1981. Bahrain stated that it was
boycotting the summit to protest Qatar's handling of their disputes over the Huwar
islands in the Gulf. Bahrain reaffirmed that its decision was not directed against
the AGCC and didn't need to torpedo its work and would remain faithful to AGCC
principles and goals. However, the Bahrain decision to boycott the summit in
Doha sent a clear signal to the AGCC leaders that unless they intervene
immediately to resolve disputes among the member states, the AGCC inaction
could destroy all gains the council has made since it was formed fifteen years ago.
The action of Bahrain has led the AGCC leaders to appoint a four- member
commission for AGCC mediation between the two countries. This decision was
taken during the Doha Summit in December, 1996. The commission consists of
the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia (Chairman), Oman, U.A.E. and Kuwait
(members). The commission has met a few times and made successful progress in
resolving the ongoing dispute between the two members of the AGCC. All media
campaigns have been stopped between the two countries to prepare the ground for
positive and constructive negotiation.
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3. Other Internal Threats
The AGCC states are seriously concerned about violence, terrorism and
"extremism" in the region. These issues are a direct threat to the security and
stability of the AGCC States. The most serious group is the so-called "Islamist
Movement" which is found in most AGCC States. The Security Services in Saudi
Arabia, Oman, Kuwait and Bahrain have uncovered secret organizations that are
using Islam to cause civil unrest and national disunity in the AGCC States. In
many cases, the organizations have external connections, both financial and
organizational. Most of their members are political activists belonging to either
the Muslim Brotherhood, or other independent organizations. In some of the
AGCC States, e.g., Bahrain, Iran was accused of providing political and financial
aid for such organizations. The members of these secret organizations are highly
sophisticated and their aim is to overthrow the AGCC governments and replace the
present ruling system with Islamic Governments.26
For example, in Oman the security services discovered an underground
organization, politically motivated and used Islam to cause internal security
problems and national disunity. The organization had more than 200 members, all
ofwhom were arrested by the authorities for questioning in May 1994.27 This
group was connected to and supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. The
announcement of the arrest shocked the Omani society. The general feeling of the
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Omani people was of surprise, anger, resentment and even sorrow, because the
people ofOman had enough political unrest in the past. The experience of the
Dhofar war is still well remembered. The Omanis want to preserve and protect the
remarkable achievements made by the people and their government under the wise
leadership of His Majesty the Sultan. They want serious economic and social
development in order to catch up with what they have missed.28 The organization
members were given fair trial. Some ofthem were found not guilty and released.
Others were found guilty and sentenced. A few ofthem were given the death
penalty, but all of them spent a little more than a year in prison because of H.M.
generous amnesty.
On the occasion of the country's 25th national day, 1995, the Omani
people were surprised again, but this time when His Majesty the Sultan ordered
amnesty for all those prisoners who had been convicted of involvement in illegal
activities and organizations. This was a magnanimous gesture, particularly to the
families of those concerned, which was well received and is typical of the way in
which His Majesty has won the hearts of his people by showing tolerance and
forgiveness.29 Violence and extremism are strange phenomena in the modern
AGCC State societies. By nature, the peoples of the AGCC States don't like
violence or aggression, as demonstrated by the reaction of the Omani society to the
announcement of the arrest and the wise handling of the issue by H. M. The
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Sultan. The base support which is essential for the success of any organization,
does not exist, and such organizations do not appeal to the people of the AGCC
States. The vast majority of the people of the AGCC States are aware of the
teachings of Islam and its basic tenets which reject bigotry. Such organizations
have done so much damage to the image of Islam in the world and we have to
correct it by showing the true tenets of Islam, its principles and tolerance.
E. THE WEST AND THE AGCC STATES
The west has been involved in the security of the region for many years.
However, oil was the primary attraction for the United States, unlike the imperial
goals of Britain and France before it. As the British influence gradually declined
in the 1960s, the U.S. started to fill the vacuum that was created by the withdrawal
of the British. The Truman Doctrine of containment held the Middle East as a
strategic region from which the fight against communism could be based.
President Carter outlined his doctrine of the Arabian Gulf in the State of the Union
Address on January 23, 1980:
Let our position be absolutely clear: an attempt by any outsideforce
to gain control ofthe Persian Gulfregion will be regarded as an
assault on the vital interests ofthe United States ofAmerica, and
such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including
militaryforce.
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This is a clear commitment from the U.S. to defend its vital interests in the region
and the U.S. has assumed full responsibility to a respond to any outside aggressor
on the AGCC States. With the loss of Iran as an ally, Saudi Arabia and other
AGCC States' strategic position grew in stature.30 The U.S. focuses on two vital
interests in the Middle East: first, the security of Israel; second, protecting and
ensuring the free flow of oil to the U.S. and its allies in the West. The security of
Israel is clearly demonstrated during all Arab-Israel wars, where the U.S. provided
unconditional, unlimited and unjustified support for Israel, and the continued
supply of military weapons and other goods necessary to fight a war. The Israeli
political lobby in the United States showed remarkable influence in pushing the
immediate and outright support for Israel's fight against its neighbors. 31
Moreover, in many cases such support is at the expense of other U.S. strategic
interests in the region and the American tax-payers. On the other hand, the oil
security principle was reflected explicitly in the reaction of the U.S. and its
Western allies to the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait and the formation of Desert Storm
Coalition. Logically, as long as the AGCC States are blessed with oil, and
Western economies depend on this commodity, these Western countries will
always protect the region and will always reformulate a Desert Storm kind of
coalition. Additionally, the West has found an excellent market for their weapons
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in the Gulf region. This can be seen as the tax that the AGCC States have to pay to
the West. 32
The strategic interest of the AGCC States and the U.S. should not be
established on a single depleted commodity (oil), but should be based on greater
economic and political cooperation, such as increased investment and trades
between the U.S. and the AGCC States and the establishment ofjoint ventures
between the American companies and AGCC States national companies. The
relation could be advanced by the U.S. providing advanced technology and
professional training for the people of the AGCC States, and the AGCC States
provide oil and other minerals that the U.S. needs. A positive step has already
been taken to establish U.S.-AGCC economic dialogue to promote economic and
political ties between the U.S. and the members of the AGCC States. But this is
not enough. Additional economic and political ties should be linked to the goals of
regional stability and security of the AGCC States.
F. REGIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCES
The security arrangement of the Gulf region is a very delicate and sensitive
issue. The AGCC States used to believe in phrases such as,"The security of the
region is the responsibility of the countries in the region." This is of course,
including the two major powers in the region, Iran and Iraq. Unfortunately, the
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GulfWar in 1990, contradicted this principle and the threat came from one of the
major powers (Iraq) in the region. On the other hand, the other major power (Iran)
continue to occupy three islands in the Arabian Gulf, continues to interfere in the
internal affairs of some of the AGCC States and continues to build an ambitious
weapon acquisition program with offensive capabilities.
It is not clear at this point, how the AGCC States can form a military
alliance with Iran and Iraq in order to protect the region from potential foreign
aggressors, since the AGCC States perceive Iran and Iraq, themselves as potential
and serious threats. The experience of the GulfWar in 1991, is still in vivid
memory of the people of the AGCC. Inviting a Western power to assist in the
security of the region does not please the AGCC States or their people, but they
were forced to do so by their big neighbors. The AGCC States paid and are still
paying a heavy price for Western protection, but their survival as sovereign states
is more important than the cost. The United States has to maintain the military
balance in the region until such time as a balance ofpower is achieved between the
AGCC States and other major powers in the region, or until more acceptable
regimes come to power in Iran and Iraq who are willing to cooperate but not to
dominate the region.
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1. The Damascus Declaration
Soon after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the AGCC States formed a
coalition with Egypt and Syria (these called AGCC + 2). This was achieved at the
Damascus Declaration. The AGCC States were to provide the financial support
for a regional security pact, while Egypt and Syria were to provide the manpower
to ensure stability. Unfortunately, some of the AGCC States became uneasy at the
thought of housing Egyptian and Syrian troops on their soil and asked them to
leave soon after the alliance was formed.33 The alliance still exists but its role in
the security of the region is very limited.
2. The Omani Proposal
Also, after the Gulf War, the AGCC leaders asked Oman to prepare a
proposal on the future security of the AGCC States. Oman proposed to establish
an independent force of 100,000 man joint troops, and the forces command to be
rotated among the member countries. 34 Oman believed that the AGCC should
enhance and develop collective capabilities that would be at least capable to deter,
delay, and fight an aggressor until Arab or international assistance arrives, if
necessary. The proposed force was to match the Iraqi Republican Guard. Oman
believed that a rotating command would enhance the level of commitment among
the member states and underscore, politically and symbolically, the collective
security aspects of their respective defense effort. 35 At the 1993 Saudi Arabia
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Summit, AGCC leaders voiced modest support of the Oman proposal and
recommended further study.36
The ambitious Omani proposal for a 100,000 strong AGCC Force was to
enhance the existing Peninsula Shield Force of 7,000 men on active service and
20,000 pledged. Now it seems that after serious study and consideration, the plan
is for 27,000 men on active duty by the year 2000, and greater standardization of
equipment and integration. 37 Also there has been a decision by the AGCC leaders
to include Air force and Navy in the Peninsula shield force, but this has not been
activated yet. During the last AGCC Summit in Doha in December, 1996, the
AGCC leaders cleared most of the problems over differences of sovereignty and
technicalities related to the enhancement of the Peninsula Shield Force and toward
building an integrated defense system. The AGCC States possess sophisticated air
power capabilities which will play a major role in the AGCC Security
arrangement. Also, the AGCC States are building an integrated early warning
system that allows information sharing and able to trigger a response if one part of
the AGCC States is threatened. At the present time, Saudi Arabia is the only
AGCC State to operate Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft
capable of monitoring the whole AGCC States and beyond. It is also the only
AGCC State with an operational, fully automatic air defensive system. Other
AGCC States are enhancing similar defensive capabilities. 38 The AGCC countries
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are extremely interested in coordinating their arms purchases in order to develop
functional compatibility of their weapons systems- a necessary requirement for
joint military exercises and operations. 39
Finally, a brief assessment of the security of the Red Sea reveals it is
important to the stability and the security of the AGCC states especially Saudi
Arabia. However, it is not a pressing issue since two friendly Arab states Egypt
and Yemen play a major part with Saudi Arabia in the security of the Red Sea.
In summary, the AGCC States must ensure their security through the
following security elements. First, they should build their own collective security
by enhancing and developing the military capabilities of the Peninsula Shield
Force. This will ensure immediate response, increase national prestige, transfer
advanced technology, create more employment, and improve international
relations. Second, AGCC States should reduce tension and defuse conflict in the
region through diplomatic and peaceful means, especially with Iran. Third,
internal security and stability are extremely important; and can be achieved
through greater political participation, social justice and high rate of economic
growth. The strange phenomenon of terrorism, violence and extremism must be
rejected and defeated at all costs. Fourth, the imbalance ofpower that has been
created after the GulfWar should be offset by the U.S. The United States should
take a less visible role in the security of the region. Establishing permanent U.S.
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bases in the AGCC states have proved to be dangerous and become a destablizing
factor. In order to maintain stability, the U.S. has the lift capability to quickly
respond to major threats of its allies in the region. The U.S. should assist the
AGCC States in building their own military capabilities to act collectively as a
new regional stabilizer.
The AGCC States should not base their relation with the west on oil, but
rather link it with greater economic and political cooperation. We should aim to
create permanent and common interests, such as establishing joint ventures. Fifth,
the AGCC policy toward Iraq will probably not change until the demise of
Saddam's regime. When that occurs, the AGCC States are likely to reconcile with
the new leadership in Baghdad. Sixth, the AGCC States should continue to
support the Middle East peace process and encourage both sides to reach a just and
comprehensive peaceful settlement.
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The economic cooperation of the AGCC States is detailed in five official
documents. They are the AGCC Charter, the unified Economic Agreement,
Common Objectives and Policies for Development plans, the unified Industrial
Development Strategy and Common Agricultural policies. All of the five
documents are approved by the Supreme Council of the AGCC. 1
The principle ofEconomic cooperation lies at the root of the formation of
the AGCC. According to Abdullah Bischara the first Secretary General of the
AGCC, much of the original incentive for the AGCC's formation may have been a
security concern, while the main thrust toward its formation was indeed economic.
Economic integration and unification in the broadest possible sense are what the
AGCC is all about.2
A. THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT (UEA)
The economic objectives that were set in Article 4 of the AGCC charter is
very broad and comprehensive, and required more focus and specific methods to
implement and achieve such ambitious objectives. "Therefore, the AGCC leaders
signed the Unified Economic Agreement in November 1981, almost immediately
after the creation of the AGCC. The Agreement catalogues the details and
specifics of Charters' objectives and sets terms to coordinate and unify economic,
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fiscal, monetary, industrial and trade policies ofAGCC member States in an
organized and specific fashion. The ultimate aim of the Agreement is to provide a
vehicle for the integration of the economics of the individual six member States
into one large regional economy. 3 The UEA consists of seven chapters and 28
articles, which are summarized below:
1
.
Coordinating activities and formulating policies and mechanisms
aimed at creating an integrated and well-diversified manufacturing
base (Article 12, Item 1).
2. Standardizing industrial legislation and encouraging local production
to meet domestic needs (Article 12, Item 2).
3. Allocating industries among member States according to relative
advantage and economic feasibility (Article 12, Item 3).
4. Establishing joint ventures among member states in the fields of
industry, agriculture and services, and supporting these ventures with
public, private and mix capital (Article 13).
5. Giving citizens of membership the right to establish commercial,
industrial and agribusiness ventures on an equal footing with citizens
of a host member state (Article 8).
6. Setting up a common investment strategy and free movement of both
labor and capital (Articles 8 and 21).
7. Coordinating training and labor policy and efforts to acquire
technology (Articles 14 and 16).
8. Liberalizing trade among member states, including waiving customs
duties on interstate trade (Articles 1, 2 and 3).
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9. Establishing a common minimum external tariff as a step to unify it
with or without the purpose of protecting national products from
unfair external competition (Article 4).
10. Coordinating export and import policies, strengthening bargaining
power vis-a-vis foreign supplies, and building common strategic
food stock (Article 7).
1 1
.
Coordinating oil policy throughout all stages of the industry (Article
ll).4
The AGCC leaders placed heavy emphasis on the economic integration as
the principal binding element of the AGCC's program activities and the driving
force for the final social and political integration of the organization. The AGCC
leaders envisaged that by creating common economic interests for the member
States and their people based on effective and sound economic plans, would
eventually lead to the ultimate objective of the AGCC, the unification of the
AGCC States.
A brief assessment of the Unified Economic Agreement reveals that it
nearly includes all components that are essential for successful economic
integration between the AGCC States.
Although the various components of the agreement are admittedly
ambitious and long-range in nature, it is equally clear that the provisions contain
built-in qualifiers regarding their eventual implementation. This point is illustrated
by the terms "seek" and "endeavor" used throughout the Agreement in reference to
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the unification of vital sectors and policies. 5 Article 24 of the Agreement
addresses this point very clearly by stating "any member states may be temporarily
exempted from applying such provisions.. .as may be necessitated by temporary
local situations in that state or specific circumstances faced by it."
It is important to take into consideration that not all countries in the
organization can implement economic policies at equal speed and efficiency.
Therefore, Article 24 of the Agreement provides this exception for the AGCC
States in implementing AGCC's economic programs. This flexible strategy
allowed the AGCC States to avoid many of the structural problems that normally
happen in most regional and international economic organizations. In addition, the
gap between the levels of economic development is very small among the AGCC
States. However, the Agreement stipulates that "consideration shall be given to
differences in the levels of development between the member states and the local
priorities of each state." In practice, however, effort to ensure equal development
opportunities in the AGCC's economic framework is subject to the step-by-step
activities of the working committees carrying out the broader objectives of the
Agreement.6
The AGCC States witnessed a high rate of economic growth and explosive
developmental projects in the 1970s and early 1980s due to the high oil prices and
the high international demand for oil. High revenue from oil enabled the AGCC
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States to embark on massive construction programs ranging from schools to
highways. In other words, a complete infrastructure for social services, public
services and industrial development was created in very few years. Economically,
these new infrastructural necessities for any economic progress and integration
played a major role in implementing the Unified Economic Agreement. Actually,
the AGCC States have made significant efforts and achieved good progress in
integrating their infrastructures and economic activities.
B. ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS
The AGCC States have made significant progress in implementing the
Unified Economic Agreement despite the difficulties which are normally
associated with regional organizations to achieve common objectives. The
economic cooperation and integration progress has been made in many economic
areas. Dr. Abdullah I. Al-Kuwaiz, the former Associated Secretary-General
divided the economic cooperation into six categories which are summarized
below: 7
1. Adopting Common Regional Strategies and Policies
New official documents have been established to give general outlines, such
as the Common Objectives and Policies for Development Plans. There are also
documents dealing with specific sectors such as the AGCC Common document
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policy and the AGCC Unified Industrial Development strategy adopted in 1985.
Two other documents have been drafted that deal with coordination of monetary
and fiscal policies and the AGCC transportation policy.
2. Building Institutions and Harmonizing Regulations
In the area of institution building the Gulf Investment Cooperation was
created with a capital ofmore than $2 billion in 1983. The AGCC organization for
Measures and Standard was established in 1984. It was given the sole
responsibility of adopting common standards for AGCC imported as well as
manufactured goods and following up their implementation. Also, the Gulf
Technical Bureau for Communications has been enhanced and expanded to include
all AGCC member states. It has been made part of the AGCC Secretarial General
and given more power to distribute air frequencies as well as enhancing further
cooperation among member states. Additionally, a new office has been
established for the registration of industrial property rights and several laws, rules,
regulations' standards and procedures have been commonly adopted by all AGCC
members, such as: common regulations relating customs, port handling, ship
registration and banking inspections, common laws for fertilizer handling, water
conservation and preservation for marine life. Common standards for building
highways and expressways in the AGCC States and more than fifty other standards
adapted by the AGCC's Organization for Measures and Standards.
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3. Creating a AGCC Economic Citizenship
This area has been dealt with in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Agreement for the
free movement of equal treatment of goods. All these Articles have been
implemented since 1983. Articles 18 and 20 give citizens of the AGCC the same
rights and treatment accorded to those belonging to their own citizens. This was
also implemented in 1983.
Article 8 of the Agreement gives all AGCC citizens the same treatment in
all member states without any discrimination or differentiation regarding freedom
of movement, work and residence, right of ownership, freedom of exercising
economic activities and free movement of capital. A number of steps have been
taken in implementing Article 8 but we are not there yet. However, equal treat-
ments have achieved in investment in industry, agriculture, fisheries, natural
resources, animal husbandry and other service sector projects. Also, e quality is
awarded in most professional, including accountants, physicians, engineers,
economists and a number of others, as well as the equality of property ownership.
It is believed that full AGCC economic citizenship and complete equality will take
some time but will be achieved eventually.
4. Creating Regional Infrastructures
When discussing the integration of the infrastructures of the AGCC, it
should be noted that the member states have built over the last two decades the
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majority of the infrastructural necessities of a modern nation. Significant
progress has been made in integrating roads, telecommunication, services such as
health care, electricity and water. Also, several studies have been made in linking
member states' infrastructures and economic activity. This includes the
integration ofAGCC ports and the need for any expansion, a regional pipeline
carrying crude oil from major AGCC oil fields to the Gulf ofOman; a AGCC
railroad networks, a major highway connecting all the member states, a high
voltage regional electric grid, and an integrated communication system. However,
the implementations of such ambitious projects were adversely affected by many
factors including the condition of the oil market and the Gulf crisis in 1991. Steps
toward integrating these vital infrastructural areas will be made on a priority basis
as resources will allow.
5. Developing Joint Venture Projects
Long before the emergence of the AGCC, joint projects were adopted by
member states at both Arab Regional and Gulf Subregional level. The formation
of the AGCC, however, further stimulated this trend and open new possibilities for
the AGCC region. Several manufacturing and agricultural projects have been
implemented such as a refractory company, a tire plant, a poultry plant and the
production and marketing of agricultural seeds. In the area of transportation, Gulf
Air if a clear example which had been established before the creation of the
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AGCC, and a Gulf coastal transport company and a land transports company.
Also, the private sector in the AGCC States has been active in establishing joint
venture projects with active encouragement of the AGCC Secretariat-General and
the financial support of the Gulf Investment Cooperation.
6. Coordinating External Policies
The last but not least of current AGCC achievements is developing some
common AGCC member-states position vis-as-vis other countries, regional and
international grouping, and multilateral institutions. This includes:
a. Joint AGCC purchases of essential, commonly imported items
to reduce overall cost to AGCC member states by virtue ofpurchasing larger
quanti-ties such as food stuffs and medicines, as well as engaging in export
promotions in the form ofjoint trade and exhibitions abroad.
b. Joint AGCC approach to regional and international assistance.
c. Joint approach to regional and international assistance.
d. Negotiating as group with AGCC trade partners, namely the
European Economic Community (EEC), the United States and Japan.
e. Joint positions and representation in multilateral institutions
such as Arabsat, Anmarsat, International civil-aviation organization, GATT and
other international organizations.
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7. Coordinating Oil Policies
The coordination of oil policies among GGC States cannot be over
emphasized, because the oil plays the major role in all AGCC States. The
importance of oil will continue for many years to come, since the AGCC States
possess over 40 percent of world crude oil reserve and in excess of 60 percent of
OPEC's reserve. 8 A sound and coordinated oil policies therefore, is of paramount
importance. It must be noted that Oman and Bahrain are not members of OPEC,
but they coordinate their oil policies closely with other AGCC States to maintain
AGCC market shares of the international oil market. Also, the AGCC States have
been coordinating oil policies within OPEC and playing a leading role in stabiliz-
ing oil prices. The stable oil policy benefits other oil producers within OPEC and
outside OPEC, as well as oil consumers such as the U.S. and the rest of the indus-
trialized world. The stable oil policies have been successful in maintaining reason-
able oil prices, increasing demand, and reducing public demand in the West to
develop alternative sources of energy.9
In assessing the achievements that have been made, it is obvious that the
implementation of the Unified Economic Agreement has made a significant
progress in integrating the economic activities of the AGCC Member States.
These achievements could not have been made without the ultimate support of the
Member States and their strong believes in common interests and destiny. Having
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said that however, the implementation of the Unified Economic Agreement with
its ambitious goals and far-reaching objectives still has to go along way to achieve
its goals of full economic integration among the Member States. There are many
challenges and limitations that are faced by the AGCC States which I will discuss
fully in the next section, but the important thing is that we have realized those
challenges and difficulties explicitly and seek to find a possible solution to resolve
them.
C. THE ECONOMIC LIMITATION OF THE AGCC STATES
The AGCC States realize the limitation of their economies. There are many
economic challenges that face the AGCC States individually and collectively to
prolonged economic growth. These real limitations have been pointed out by Dr.
Abdullah El-Kuwaiz and are summarized below: 10
1
.
The six Member States are overly dependent on the export of crude
oil. Although the private sector has increased its shares in the gross
domestic product (GDP), but its role in the industrialization process
is still below what it should be. Given the AGCC geographic and
economic constraints the AGCC States still faces somewhat chronic
scarcity ofhuman resources mainly in skilled labor.
2. The AGCC domestic markets are rather limited and scattered. If the
AGCC concentrates on international markets, it has to compete
vigorously with the well-established manufacturers of industrial
countries and other developing countries. They also lack the
experience of dealing the very complicated subject of international
trade.
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3. Other than hydrocarbons, the AGCC States have limited mineral
resources and a scarcity of natural water.
4. Although almost all infrastructure facilities are in place in the AGCC
States, interconnection among these facilities is very limited. Indus-
trial regulations and legislation, as well as industrial incentive, are
different in nature and application in each of the Member States.
5. The AGCC States do not have an indigenous technological base with
which to encourage industrial growth and development.
Additionally, The Iraqi-Iran war 1981-1988 and the GulfWar in 1991
destabilized the Gulf region and affected foreign investment and the security of
Gulf shipping. However, the AGCC States have been successful in defusing
tension and reducing potential conflict in the region, especially with Iran, in order
to create a stable and secure atmosphere in the region for economic growth and
regional development.
The worldwide economic stagnation in the mid 1980s and the reduction of
oil prices during that period and early 1990 adversely affected the AGCC States.
This resulted in delaying or halting major developmental projects in the AGCC
States. The 1990-91 Gulf crisis did away with most of the reserves in most of the
AGCC States and forced Saudi Arabia to borrow from foreign creditors, probably
for the first time in the country's modern history. Also, the war cost Kuwait most
of its financial reserves from foreign investments that Kuwait had wisely accumu-
lated in its Reserve Fund for Future Generations. Additionally, after the war
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Kuwait was left with formidable and costly tasks in rebuilding its oil industry
facilities ravaged by Iraq in the course of its August 2, 1990-invasion. Finally, the
global economic recession in mid- 1980, the decline of oil prices and the Gulf war,
presented real economic challenges and created budget deficits in all AGCC
States.
Despite the increase in oil revenues due to high oil prices, and high rate of
economic growth, most of the AGCC States are still unable to balance their
budgets. This situation demonstrated the vulnerability of the AGCC States'
economies which remain tied to the fortunes of a single commodity in the
international market. However, within the AGCC States, countries were affected
differently by the economic recession. The U.A.E. probably suffered the most,
while Bahrain because of its modest oil revenues and economic diversifications
particularly in the services didn't feel the full brunt of the economic recession. 11
The modest experience of Bahrain economic diversification will lead the
author to discuss the AGCC States effort to diversify their economy away from oil.
D. DIVERSIFICATION PROGRAMS
1. Why Do We Have to Diversify?
The foregoing discussion of the AGCC States economic challenges and
limitations clearly illustrates the necessity to adopt a common and ambitious
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diversification programs to diversify the oil based economy away from oil which is
subject to the fluctuation of the world price of oil. This was well illustrated in
1986 when there was a sudden and violent decline in oil prices, necessitating
aggressive actions such as devaluating the national currency and halting the
implementations of vital developmental and social projects. Such action was very
uncomfortable for both the AGCC Governments and the people of the AGCC
States.
However, the fact is that the economies of the AGCC States are based
largely on the extraction and export of a single commodity "oil" which in turn, is
derived from a depleting economic base. The depletable nature of oil resource
means that each barrel of oil extracted today reduces the number of barrels to be
produced in the future by an equivalent amount. This distinguishes oil exporters
and, for that matter, exporters of all depletable resources, from exporters of
agricultural or manufactured products, since the income or output of the latter is
derived from a sustainable economic base. 12 In other words, by producing a barrel
of oil today, the wealth of the country is reduced in the future unless the oil
revenue is invested carefully into productive domestic or foreign assets. 13
A simple comparison of a diversified economy to an economy based totally
on oil may be useful. In a diverse economy, economic output from agriculture and
industry can be expected at a constant level for all future generations as long as the
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soil does not deteriorate, capital is replaced and natural disasters do not occur.
More likely, if the Capital base is increased through investment and technological
change to enhance productivity, output will in fact increases over time. In an
economy totally based on the extraction of exhaustible resources, this constancy or
growth of a natural product is not assured. 14 In the AGCC States oil is expected to
run out within a generation in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman within two generations in
U.A.E. and within three generations in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 15
2. Uniform Strategy for the Industrial Development (USED)
The Gulf States had realized the seriousness of basing the economies on a
single commodity (oil) before the inception of the AGCC. Limited individual and
collective efforts were made in this direction. This trend illustrated the commit-
ment of the AGCC States to economic diversification so that the oil and gas-based
economy would not be vulnerable to price fluctuation or eventual depletion of oil
and gas resources.
The formation of the AGCC in 1981, however, provided the common
ground and the forum to discuss the Economic integration as it was one of the
main objectives of the AGCC. The issue of economic diversification was
extensively and seriously debated and discussed. As a result of such discussions,
the AGCC State came to the conclusion in October 1981 to establish the Industrial
Cooperation Committee (ICC) composed of the Ministers of Industry of the
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AGCC States to establish a USID. The ICC held its first meeting in Riyadh on 21-
22 October 1981, and adopted the following resolutions. 16
"The Committee shall establish the basic principles and policies for the
Formation of an industrial development strategy for the AGCC States, taking into
consideration the conditions prevailing in the area and its nature. The State of
Kuwait shall submit a memorandum on this matter to the Secretariat."
The document on the USID was approved by ICC on 25 September 1985,
and approved by the Supreme Council of the AGCC States at its sixth session in
Muscat (Oman) on 3-6 November 1985. 17 The ICC established the following basic
principles as a strategy for industrial development, which are summarized below:
a. Basic Objectives ofthe Uniform Strategy 1 *
1. To give impetus to industrialization in all AGCC States.
2. To maximize the contribution of the manufacturing industries in the
GNP.
3. To increase the participation of national labor in the industry sector.
4. To narrow the differences in the industrial growth rates of the AGCC
States.
5. To achieve an acceptable level of self-sufficiency in the production
of manufactured goods in the AGCC States.
6. To create attractive opportunities for investment of financial sur-
pluses and savings of the AGCC States.
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7. To bring about the integration of the petroleum and gas sector with
other sectors of the economy.
8. To create authentic base for research and applied science and
technology.
9. To develop the national resources available with the area and
enhance the efficiency of their industrial exploitations.
10. To encourage the establishment of manufacturing industries in rural
and less-developed areas.
b. The Priority ofthe Uniform Strategy™
The emphasis is placed on the following industries:
1
.
Industries based on the exploitations and development of local
natural resources, including external market-oriented industries.
2. Industries that supply urgent needs in the Gulf markets, including
food industries.
3 Development of small and medium size that supply local market
needs which technically and psychologically prepare the society of
the AGCC States for developing into an industrial society.




Industries already existing in the AGCC States.
2. New industries that would contribute and enhance the success of the
existing industries.
83
3. Modern technology and capital intensive industries, and utilization
of locally available energy.
4. Export-industries with high relative benefits.
5. Strategic goods industries, e.g., industries that are important to
security.
6. Import-substitution industries with economic of scale that use a high
proportion ofraw materials in the Gulf region.
7. Industries owned jointly by AGCC Governments or citizens or both.
8. Capital goods industries directed toward Gulf and external markets,
particularly Arab and Islamic Market.20
The incentives are provided in the form of technical and training
assistance, customs duty and tax exemption and loans on easy terms. Also, the
Uniform Strategy provides the tool to protect the infant industries from the outset
of the AGCC, and protect local industries - most especially cement, steel, copper
and asbestos, as well as encouraging industries such as fiberglass. Additionally,
the Uniform Strategy has sought to reduce intra-AGCC competition and duplica-
tion of industries through central planning, e.g., stopped the establishment of
cement factories (at one stage), because there were enough factories to meet the
regional demand. 21
The Uniform Strategy for the Industrial Development provides the
AGCC States with clear and common guidelines to establish industries that focus
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on the utilization of local resources and capital-intensive industries. Also, the
strategy provides for industrial development among the member states, "suited to
potential and conditions of each state," aimed at narrowing the gap between them.
This is yet another example of the compensatory nature of the AGCC economic
program.22
Taking the concept and the guidelines of the USID, I will now apply
them to one of the member states (Oman) to show the effort that has been made in
this area to diversify the economy. Similar efforts have been pursued in other
AGCC States, but for the sake of brevity I will discuss Oman since it is the most
familiar state to the author.
The development of local industry in Oman has witnessed tremen-
dous progress recently. The Government-objective is to create additional economy
based on private enterprise, and ensuring rapid growth of viable industries,
utilizing local resources as much as possible. A Master Plan was prepared at the
Ministry of Industry for (1991-2005) period with the assistance of the United
Nation Industrial Development organization (UNIDO) and Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA). The plan projects a growth of above 12.9% per
annum during the Fourth Five-year Plan (1991-1995) and around 10% in the Plan
(1996-2000).23
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The private sector in Oman plays a leading role on the basis of
competition in a free economy. The Government has been very successful in
establishing industrial facilities which are purposely built to provide fully serviced
industrial estates. In the first phase, the Rusayl Industrial Estate was established in
1983 in the capital area Muscat. The Estate is in all respects fully-serviced with its
own power station, fueled by natural gas and its own water supply. By the end of
1985, 13 factories were in production and during the following two years 17
advanced factories were completed. By the beginning of 1994, 62 factories were
in production. In the same year 22 were constructed on the Rusyl Industrial
Estate.
24 The factories in the Rusyl Industrial Estate produce various types of
goods such as food stuffs, textiles, aluminum and copper cables, contact lenses,
and so forth. The Government policy in Oman is not to concentrate the Industrial
Estates or (cities) in one area but to establish them throughout the country in order
to provide employment for the locals and to affect development and economic
growth in rural areas. Therefore, three other industrial Estates have been created;
one in Nizwa (in the interior), one in Sohar (in the north) and one in Raysut (in the
South.)
On the Sohar industrial Estate there are currently 12 factories in
production and nine other under construction, while at Raysut there are now five
factories in production and 13 others are under construction. At Nizwa, Phase 1
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(26 hectares) of the infrastructure has been completed.25 Additionally, studies
have been made for three more industrial Estates in three major cities, Buraimi in
the west, Sur in the east, and Khasab in the extreme north. At the writing of this
thesis, three major factories under active consideration which would require capital
investment of $3 billion, namely a Urea Fertilizer plant for the Indian export
market, a 360,000 tonnes capacity, Aluminum Smelter and a 260,000 tonnes Petro
Chemical Plant.26
Obviously, the AGCC countries are committed to reducing their
dependency on oil by investing their oil revenues in establishing industrial cities.
This trend was clearly illustrated in Oman's case and the rest of the AGCC States
which adopt similar approaches according to each State condition as provided by
the Uniform Strategy for the Industrial Development. The AGCC States place
great emphasis on oil and gas industries and metal processing industries. These
are all energy-intensive industries and natural gas which are available in
abundance. Also, refining of crude oil is the most significant oil-based industry in
the AGCC States. This industry provides the AGCC states with oil products for
energy and industrial uses such as lubrication; it allows them control over the oil
business; and it satisfies domestic demands for refined products. Industrialization
in general serves several purposes in the development process; which are
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diversification and self-reliance, manpower training, income generation and
technology transfer.27
The AGCC States have made significant progress in oil-based
industries and to less extent in other industries which hold great promise in
diversifying their economies away from oil.
3. The AGCC Joint Agricultural Policy
This policy is prepared by the Ministers ofAgriculture in the AGCC States
during their first meeting on January 10, 1983 and stipulates the following:
In achieving agricultural integration among the council states,
according to the unified strategy which is based on the maximum use
of available water resources, and provide for food security from
National resources, the Secretariat General is commissioned to draw
up a draft joint agriculture policy which is self-developing and
increases production while encouraging joint projects with the
participation of the private sector.28




The policy will be undertaken by means of a unified strategy to
achieve economic and social objectives.
2. The policy is aimed at the achievement of agricultural integration
among the Council States.
3. The policy is based on the optimum use of available natural
resources.
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4. The policy must seek to achieve the highest possible levels of self-
sufficiency, especially in relation to food commodities.29
b. The Pivots ofthe Joint Policy?
The pivot ofjoint action for the joint policy requires the balance and
harmony in efforts to implement the policy programs which are as follows:
1
.
Joint programs for the coordination of local agricultural plans and
policies.
2. Joint policy for agricultural and food production.
3. Joint program for serving, exploiting and preserving natural
resources.
4. Joint programs for agricultural research and technological
development.
The joint agricultural policy enables the AGCC States to coordinate
their efforts and utilize available resources effectively in a coordinated manner.
This policy encouraged and provides with common objectives the AGCC States to
move forward individually and collectively with the economic diversification
programs on the basis of reciprocal and balanced benefits to the cooperating
parties.
A major concern in the AGCC is the regional food security, due to
the scarcity of water resources, high salinity in the soil and extremely high
89
temperatures in most of the AGCC States. Such factors are not conducive and
make it very expensive in carrying out extensive agricultural programs. Article 7
of the Unified Economic Agreement stipulates that "Member States will make
arrangements to coordinate policies for building up strategic food stocks." The
Food Security issue has been tackled by setting up strategic food reserve stocks in
all AGCC States, as well as giving priority in extensive agricultural investment to
develop food production capabilities. 31
The economic diversification program of the AGCC not only put
great emphasis on industry, but also allocated large sums on the development of
modern agriculture. The strategic objective of the AGCC States was to increase
the domes-tic food production for a growing population, as well as preventing
population drift to the urban areas. The strategic importance of "food security"
stemmed from fears that food exports to Saudi Arabia (and other AGCC States
might some day be cut offby Western countries in order to pressure Saudi Arabia
(and the rest of the AGCC States) to change their oil policies, just as declared Arab
oil embargo in 1973 was designed to influence Western policies. 32
Within the AGCC States Saudi Arabia and Oman possess the most
suitable land for cultivation. However, similar efforts for agricultural development
have been made by all AGCC States. Water resources are the critical issue in the
AGCC States. We have two conflicting objectives. Increasing cultivated land
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would reduce the scarce resources of water. In order to make the best use of the
available water resources, a subsidized modern irrigation system is being installed
in the rapid increasing local farms, as well as building recharge dams to intercept
flood flows in Wadis, which would otherwise run to waste in the sea or inland into
the desert. In Saudi Arabia wheat production escalated from 142,000 tons in 1929
to over two million tons in 1984, more than twice domestic requirements. In 1991,
wheat production doubled again to four million tons, the excess was given away to
some of the poorer Arab States. 33 The Saudis also achieved almost self-sufficiency
in other agricultural products, such as dates, eggs, meat, poultry, milk, fruits,
vegetables and cereals.34
In Oman, over half of the population is still engaged in the
agricultural and fishing industry, and a large number of the populations live in
rural villages. Oman was able to achieve nearly 50% self-sufficiency in food
production by the end of 1994, with a goal ofmuch higher percentage by the year
2000. The value of agricultural and fisheries production rose from $44 million in
1970 to $407 million by 1994. 35 Agriculture and fisheries are Oman's main non-
oil exports, representing 70% of the country's non-oil export. In 1994, agricultural
production totaled around 802,000 tons, ofwhich livestock was about 23,000 and
fish production 144,300 tons. 36
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In light of the above it is clear that the AGCC States have made
significant progress in agricultural development of food production and gained
maximum productivity of the available water resources. While the diversification
of the economies in the AGCC States put greater emphasis on the development of
industry and agriculture, heavy spending also has been made in other areas to
increase government revenues. This includes the development of quality tourism,
especially in U.A.E. and Oman, foreign investment in most AGCC States, but
mainly in Kuwait, offshore banking, particularly in Bahrain, corporate taxation in
all AGCC States, as well as privatization of most public sector services, such as
water and electricity to encourage the private sector which has been playing a
major role in the diversification programs. Therefore, it is safe to say that the
AGCC States are using the oil revenue to diversify the economy away from oil.
E. HUMAN RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL DEVELOPMENT
The development ofhuman resources is given the top priority in the AGCC
States. Huge investment in human capital has been made to improve the skills and
the education at all levels and fields of the entire populations.
The AGCC economic and Social Planning Committee composed of the
Ministries of Planning in Member States adopted a common strategy for human
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resources' development and approved by the Supreme Council in December 1984.
The strategy is summarized as follows: 37
1. Objective of the Common Strategy38
• Developing the social, cultural and health standards of the citizens.
• Interacting positively with human thought and culture with a view to
acquiring the ability for innovative thought which is in harmony with
the teaching of Islam and Arab identity.
• Developing manpower through education and training.
• Achieving population balance in member states which suffer an
imbalance in population structure.
• Creating social prosperity ensuring that individual citizens will enjoy
the minimum level of a good standard of living within resources
endowment in each state.
• Emphasizing social solidarity and mutual support among the
societies of the council states.
• Emphasizing qualitative human development.
2. The Policy for Manpower Development39
Primary and intermediate education for all boys and girls shall be
mandatory.
Identifying beyond the intermediate level those students capable of
higher education and those that can be guided toward technical and
vocational education.
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• Evaluating programs and curricula of University education,
especially admission policy.
• Opening suitable field ofwork for women to enable them to
participate in the development process.
• Limiting bursaries to proficient students and those field of
specialization identifying as requiring incentives.
• Giving attention to the quality of training by concentrating on the use
of advanced technology.
• Output of education and training programs should reflect the
qualitative actual needs of the economy.
• A greater concentration on training with the aim of encouraging on
the job training.
• Giving paramount importance to libraries and modern information
sources.
40
3. The Policy for Community Development
• Correcting the population imbalance in Member States in order to
decrease the percentage of non-nationals to what is required by
economic necessities.
• Creating public awareness of the importance of work as a religious
and social value, with a view to change attitudes toward certain
occupations.
• Increasing the concern for the disabled and introducing programs for
their rehabilitation and welfare.
• Providing more care for children and developing their capabilities at
all levels.
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•Considering the possibility of introducing some basic military
training subjects into secondary schools' curricula.
Expanding anti-illiteracy and adult education programs in order to
eliminate illiteracy.
Giving attention to preventive medical care and health education.
Increasing the capabilities of individuals to increase their income and
standard of living.
Paying more attention to welfare programs in all fields, especially
the youth to develop the physical and mental capabilities ofyoung
people.
The above strategy for human resources development is very ambitious and
far-reaching. Significant progress has been made by the member states indivi-
dually and collectively in the above fields.
4. Challenges ofHuman Resources Development
The AGCC States are very serious about the development ofhuman
resources. It is the center of all other developments. Educated and productive
population is the real wealth of the nation.
The health care services in all AGCC States are outstanding. Medical
services and hospital treatment are provided free of charge to all AGCC's citizens.
As a direct result of this, the AGCC States have experienced an unprecedented rate
of population growth over the past 25 years, which has created a wholly new
demographic structure. This led all AGCC States to adjust their plan accordingly
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to accommodate the requirements of the new generation in terms of education,
employment and other services.
The total population of the AGCC States is around 25.9 million, comprising
17 million nationals and 8.9 million expatriates. Average indigenous population
growth is around 3.5%. Fertility rates are 3.9 in Bahrain, 4.8 in Qatar, 5.6 in
Kuwait, 6.7 in Saudi Arabia, and Oman and U.A.E. around 7.8. The average
infant mortality rate is 35 deaths per thousand live births in all AGCC States.
Death rates have fallen less than five per thousand.41
The high growth rate led to a very youthful population structure. 42% of
total population is estimated to be under 1 5 years of age while only 4% is over 60
years old.42 This demographic change means that a high dependency ratio of non-
earners on earners and on the State, and even more importantly for the immediate
future, a large number of indigenous work force will enter the marketplace later
this decade. Therefore, serious and careful planning must take place now, to make
maximum utilization of the available indigenous human resources. Gradual
replacement of expatriate workers who occupy many millions ofjobs in the
AGCC States must be initiated. There is no shortage ofjobs in the near future if
the nationals develop and create the right attitude toward the replacement of
expatriates. This should be the objective of all AGCC States.
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The replacement of expatriates should not be at the expense of efficiency.
Specific education and training must be planned and implemented to make the
gradual transition successful. Certain amount of expatriates will have to be
maintained for economic and security necessities, as the AGCC States use high-
tech equipment which requires highly skilled labor. Likewise, the youngsters now
entering the labor market are far better educated than their parents' generation, a
sign of the achievements of the AGCC education systems.
Unfortunately, the oil boom period in the 1970s created a dependent society
in most AGCC States. The Governments shared the oil wealth with the people,
without realizing this approach would create unproductive society. In turn, the
society became wealthy and relied on the Governments to provide money and
foreign labors to do both skilled and unskilled workers. Such approach created
many social and economic problems such as creating social culture that relies on
others to do the private sectors' work. The level of this unhealthy phenomenon
varies largely among the AGCC States depending on the level of wealth of the
society in each member State. This unpleasant experience which should be
eliminated from the AGCC Societies has created a mentality of unwillingness to
work in the private sector, reluctance toward certain occupations and the
widespread preference for secure government employment.
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The achievement in education and training in the AGCC States is indisput-
able. Education takes the top priority, but are we producing the right mix with the
right quality and the correct skills that meet the demands of modern economy? I
will discuss this issue later in the next subsection.
5. Efforts to Nationalize the Work Force
The effort to nationalize or localize the labor force is evident in all AGCC
States' development plans. The boom period of the 1970s is over, the condition of
the oil market is not stable and the diversification programs are still in the early
stages, and their contribution to the total revenue is limited. The fact is that, the
AGCC Governments no longer can afford to offer jobs in the public sector for the
majority of their citizens. Careful plans and priorities are made to allocate the
scarce available financial resources in order to maximize returns on the long term.
Therefore, the private sector in the AGCC States should play a major role in
employing nationals with the assistance of the Government. However, there are
many problems that must be overcome to achieve these goals. This includes the
nationals' mind set of preferring secure and government jobs with more
convenient working hours and attractive pay scale, as well as reluctance to accept
certain jobs in industry and construction. From the employer point of view,
nationals are too expensive to employ and can't be made redundant as easily as
expatriates. According to a study by the Saudi-based National Commercial Bank,
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private sector employers will rely on expatriates until nationals "acquire the right
technical skills, change their attitude toward manual work, and adjust their wage
expectations to the realities of the marketplace."43
In order to assist the private sector to employ nationals and to encourage the
nationals to take up employment in the private sector, the present situation of
cheaper and mere qualified foreign labor must be changed. Expatriates should be
made more expensive and nationals must be made more qualified, more skillful
and more aware of the demand and supply reality of free market economy. To
make the nationals more qualified, all AGCC Governments have been
implementing massive nationalization programs, such as the "Saudiization,"
"Omanization" and "Qatarization" programs to replace expatriate workers with
nationals. For the sake of brevity I will discuss the Omani experience with the
Omanization program.
The primary objective of the Omanization plan, which was introduced in
1991, is to replace expatriates with qualified and trained Omanis in public and
private sectors. In public sector, a sum of $50 million was allotted in the 1991/95
development plan to the Omanization Plan.44 Detailed arrangements have been
made for designing and implementing training programs to qualify Omanis for the
job they will hold. They are trained to work closely with expatriates for six
months to two years, to gain practical experience and develop their skills. This
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Omanization process ensures that the trainees have the necessary experience to
enable them to perform efficiently and effectively.45 The target for Omanization
Plan (1991-1995) was 72% excluding the Ministries of Health and Education,
which employ more than three-quarters of the expatriates in public sector. By
mid- 1995 the target has been exceeded and 85% Omanization has been achieved.46
In the private sector the Government follows similar Omanization plans and
it is progressing steadily. The Government provides rewarding opportunities for
both the Omanis who work in the private sector and the firms that employ
nationals. On 1991, the Supreme Committee for Vocational training decided to
pay owners of private companies that employ Omanis compensation equal to a
proportion of the salaries and allowances paid to their employees for a period up to
three years.47 Also, the Government stipulated a fixed Omanization ratio in six
areas of private sectors to be achieved by the end of 1996. Transport, storage and
communication are to have 60% Omanization, finance, insurance and real estate
45%, industry 35%, hotel and restaurant 30%, wholesale or retail trading 20% and
contracting 15%.48
Additionally, it is important to note that much of the Omani banking sector
has been Omanized. Finally, most AGCC made it more expensive by raising visa
and renewal fee ofwork permits, but this does not solve the entire problem of the
foreign labor force. The AGCC States still have to coordinate their efforts to
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reform the education system and more importantly to change the nationals' attitude
toward working in the private sector.
6. Education Reform
Employers complain that the education systems are turning out national
workers with inappropriate or inadequate skills. There are simply not enough
skilled and qualified nationals and the standard of English is low. There are also
shortages of vocational and technical training establishments.49 Overall, the
education systems in the AGCC states require comprehensive reform to create a
skilled labor force capable of handling new industrial technologies and other
technical skills required for modern economy.
Despite the enormous effort by the AGCC states in the area of education,
the questions are being raised to whether quantity is being matched with quality.
The AGCC Governments recognize this problem and are striving to reform their
training and education systems to address the quality problem to ensure a better fit
between the quality and the quantity ofjob seekers and the economy needs but this
goal is still far away from achievement. The ultimate aim should be to provide
world class training and education system with great emphasis on vocational




To ensure love and respect for work and self-reliance and to
encourage initiative, creativity, and positive attitude toward labor
and vocational training.
2. To reduce general offerings in the curriculum and to concentrate
instead on Arabic and English languages, and on the sciences and
technological field.
3. To strengthen citizenship education and the feeling of national
belonging.
4. To develop an aptitude for thinking, meditation, reflecting rather
than rote memory and regurgitation.
5. Rectify teachers through competency tests and enhance the ability of
school administrators through further training and development.
6. To encourage students to pursue self-education.
7. To provide an atmosphere of academic freedom that would allow for
independent scholarly research and exchange of ideas without fear of
restriction.
8. Encourage women to take up employment in social work, teaching,
nursing and even banking to solve the manpower problem.
9. Encourage teachers to keep up with research in their fields and to
specialize in certain levels and fields of education.50
To this could be added the introduction of computers at all levels of
education including the primary level. Also, the introduction of Internet system at
all AGCCs' universities and collages which is a very useful tool in the quest for
"true" knowledge. The exchange of teachers and school administrators among
AGCC States cannot be overemphasized due to the importance of exchanging
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knowledge, experience and ideas in the field of education between the AGCC
States. The overall objective is to create a AGCC individual that is well qualified
for the job he is trained for, and capable of giving and receiving criticism in his
field, and able to handle the problems effectively and efficiently.
In summary, the economic cooperation and integration play the major role
in binding the AGCC States together. The Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) is
the pivotal point in the economic cooperation. It is ambitious and has a far-
reaching impact on the success of the AGCC. The AGCC States made significant
progress in implementing the common policies of the UEA, but full implementa-
tion still remains a common goal that must be achieved in the future. The AGCC
States must move away from the oil based-economies. They must maximize the
returns from oil to diversify their economies away from oil and base their
economies on sustainable resources. Diversification programs in industries and
agriculture have made good progress but still face certain challenges such as lack
of qualified indigenous labor force and lack of sufficient under ground water
resources. Human resources' development is the top priority in the AGCC States,
but the education systems need a radical reform to meet the demands of the
modern economies that the AGCC States are seeking to establish.
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) represents both a model for
development and unity in the Arab world and a working example of interstate
cooperation. 1 The AGCC is the first regional organization in the modern Arab
world aside from the Arab League which was formed in 1946. The Charter of the
AGCC was carefully drafted to be compatible with the Arab League's objectives
and inspirations.
At the time of the foundation of the AGCC in Abudhabi in 1981, there was
a great deal of speculation about what was actually being founded. Many saw it as
a regional defensive alliance, some saw it as a regional grouping reflecting differ-
ences among members with the Arab League. Others saw it as more positively as
an attempt to bring the Arab Gulf States together in order to keep them closer and
more united. Also, there were even those who felt that it was yet another group
without any significant role to play.2
The AGCC, however, soon proved itself that it was a successful regional
organization with the primary goal of formalizing and enhancing political,
economic, security and social cooperation and integration among its Member
States. In fact, its strategies and attitudes promote unity and brotherhood in the
region. 3
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Many people and organizations in the West perceive the AGCC as a
security organization, with primary goals of military cooperation. This is largely
due to the circumstances and the timing during which this organization was
created. The establishment of the AGCC in 1981 coincided with three main events
in the late 1980s; the Iranian Revolution, the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, and
the Iran-Iraq War. In fact, in 1981, security cooperation was not even mentioned
as one of the basic objectives of the AGCC. None of the six specific areas of
cooperation under paragraph three of Article Four of the AGCC Charter touches
on security.4 The focus was mainly on economic, political, and social forms of
cooperation. The reason for this was to reduce the opposition to the creation of the
new organization, or to be perceived as a threat to any of the AGCC's neighbors,
since the AGCC did not include all countries in the Gulf region.
The success of the AGCC States in binding its member states together
during difficult times such as the Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988, and the GulfWar
(1990-1991) must be defended and praised. Right from the beginning, the AGCC
states were determined to make the AGCC a viable organization and to prove that
all ill-predictions were wrong. Also, they were well aware that similar regional
organizations in this volatile area, such as the short-lived Arab cooperation council
(ACC), have failed to live up to the ideas of their founders.
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Many factors contributed to the success of the AGCC. The AGCC States
share more common characteristics than any other group in the region. This is
reflected in the Arabic language, Islamic religion, similar (if not identical)
economic, political, social systems as well as a common history. This is coupled
with a strong sense of common destiny as well as the members' awareness that
only in combination do they possess a proper viability as a political and
demographic independent entity in today's world. 5
The citizens of the AGCC have placed high hopes in the AGCC, especially
its role as a vehicle for comprehensive, social, economic, cultural development and
effective regional stability and security.6 It is true that the AGCC has not yet met
all the expectations of the citizens of its Member States, but through the AGCC
indivi-dual States, they have been able to achieve collectively what they are unable
to achieve individually. For example, they have benefited from trade negotiations
as a group with the AGCC main trade partners, namely the European Economic
Community (EEC), the U.S. and Japan. Also, they have saved large resources by
making joint AGCC purchases of essential, commonly imported items to reduce
cost to AGCC Member States, by buying large quantities, for example, foodstuffs
and medicines. 7
The AGCC effort to build a strong and united Arabian Gulf through the
organization is highly appreciated by the citizens of various member states.
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Within the AGCC collective interest is seen as more important than the individual
one.
8
The AGCC is seriously concerned about violence, terrorism, and extremism
within the AGCC States. The Security Services in most AGCC States uncovered
secret organizations with external connections that are using Islam to achieve
political ends, and cause civil unrest and disunity in the AGCC States.9 Since its
inception, the AGCC has been promoting harmony, tolerance in accordance with
Islamic teachings, and understanding among its own people and people from other
religions and cultures. By nature, the people of the AGCC States don't like
violence, and extremism is seen as some strange phenomenon. In fact, such
organizations have attracted no public support and rather, treated as a sick
minority.
However, in order for the AGCC to succeed further, the AGCC States must
address difficult problems and meet major challenges, such as security, the nature
of the economy, the massive foreign labor force, the small size of skilled indigen-
ous labor force and the limited political participation in the decision making
process. We should be bold enough to recognize our problems and make
concerted efforts to solve them.
The high population growth rate as well as the decline of the oil prices in
the international market have resulted in slow economic growth, low domestic
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expenditure, fewer developmental projects, and have cut into government's
employment. The governments of the AGCC States' measures to rationalize
government spending to reflect the reality of the economies have caused tensions
in some societies of the AGCC States. The citizens of the AGCC must adapt to
the new reality and forget about the oil boom period in the 1970s.
Each AGCC State has practiced and succeeded in social, political and
economic aspects, but each State has its own distinctive method of achieving and
succeeding than others in implementing certain policies and programs. Therefore,
each country has much to offer to adapt a collective strategy for their common
interests and prosperity. For example, the rest of the AGCC States should acquire
Bahrain's economic philosophy in diversifying its economy; from Oman, the
strategy of surviving with low level of foreigners, high quality of training and
work commitment, and its courageous step in solving its border disputes with all
its neighbors; from Saudi Arabia, mass industrialization and the continuation of
running the country with the Islamic laws and values; from the political participa-
tion of Kuwait; the love and care of the U.A.E. government of their people; 10 as
well as the dynamic and drastic changes of policies to improve efficiency in the
public sector and freedom of the press in Qatar.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Economic growth and progress are only possible in an atmosphere of
stability and security in the region. Therefore, the AGCC States must reduce
tension and defuse potential conflicts in the region. Potential problems with Iran
and Iraq should be settled through diplomatic and peaceful means. Undoubtedly,
the AGCC States, Iran and Iraq suffered greatly from Iran-Iraq war in 1980-1988,
and the GulfWar in 1991. By the end of the two wars, all countries in the region
were losers. The actual winners were Israel and the weapons industry in the West
and around the Globe. We must understand that it in the interest of some countries
to keep the region under continuous turmoil.
2. The AGCC States must enhance and build their own collective
security by developing and improving the military capabilities of the existing
(Gulf) Island Shield Force. This will not only ensure immediate military response,
but will provide a much needed delay to potential aggressors. The AGCC States
should not count on a Desert Storm- kind of response from the West in the future,
especially if the Western interest in the region declines. The AGCC States are
confronted with such security threats because of its enormous economic resources.
The U.S. should keep at low a profile in any security arrangements with the AGCC
States, and assist the AGCC States in building their own military capabilities to act
collectively as a new regional stabilizer.
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3. The AGCC States should not base their relations with the West in
general and the U.S. in particular on a single commodity (oil), but rather link it
with greater economic, political and cultural cooperation. We should aim to create
permanent common interests such as joint ventures, common universities estab-
lished in the Gulf, cultural centers in the AGCC States and the U.S. as well as
increased investment and trade between the U.S. and the AGCC States. Positive
steps in this direction have already been taken to establish U.S.-AGCC economic
dialogue to promote economic and political ties.
4. The AGCC States are a moderate force in this hot spot region of the
World. The Arabs have accepted the peace process in the Middle East as their
strategic choice in reaching a just and comprehensive peaceful settlement in the
region, based on the principle of "Land for Peace" to settle the Arab-Israeli
conflict. The AGCC has been very supportive of the peace process. The AGCC
States should continue to encourage both sides to reach a just and lasting
settlement that is acceptable by all parties. Events have proved that there is a
direct link between security and stability in the Middle East and in World stability.
Solving the Palestinian question, which is the center to all other problems in the
Middle East, and establishing just and comprehensive peace would be highly
conductive to a more stable international order.
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5. Disagreement and differing points ofview of certain issues, such as
relations with Iran do exist within the AGCC member States, but such
disagreements are natural in any healthy regional organization. The important
thing is that differ-ences should not be allowed to widen the gap between member
States. Emotional and heated statements serve no purpose except to anger
individuals and push the member states further apart. 11 This situation was clearly
reflected in the strained relations between two of the AGCC Member States (Qatar
and Bahrain) in late 1996, over a very old border dispute. This led the AGCC to
appoint a four-member commission for AGCC mediation between the two coun-
tries which has been very successful. In order to succeed, we must organize our-
selves and put our own house in order. The AGCC must have a firm grasp of
existing problems such as border disputes. We should clearly state what the
problems are, how serious they are, and what possible solutions are available to us.
This is no place for high-flown yet meaningless courtesies. Go direct to the point
and attempt to solve the problem from the center. 12 It will be very disappointing
and frustrating for nationals of the AGCC States after the recent and unpleasant
experience between Qatar and Bahrain, if the AGCC States continue to push for
petty claims against each other. Unity and common cause must be the objective of
all concerned.
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6. Oil revenues have enabled AGCC States to carry out explosive
developmental programs and have built the majority of the infra structural
necessities of modern nations. Today, the economies of the AGCC States are still
largely oil-based, which are subject to the fluctuation of world oil prices.
Diversification programs in all AGCC States have been under implementation for
many years, especially in the fields of industry and agriculture, but their contribu-
tion to the national income is still limited. Further aggressive diversification
programs of the economies in the AGCC States are no longer an option, but a
necessity. Additional foreign trade and investment, as well as quality tourism and
corporate taxation, should be encouraged. The efficiency and capability of the
private sector must be enhanced to play major roles in the diversification effort. A
specific percentage of oil revenues should be invested and saved as as National
Strategic Reserve. The AGCC State must maximize the returns from oil to diver-
sify their economies away from oil and base them on sustainable resources.
7. The Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) is the heart of the
economic cooperation. The AGCC States have made significant progress in
implementing the common policies of the UEA. Full implementation, however,
still remains a goal in the future. The citizens of the AGCC place great expecta-
tions and high hopes on seeing the UEA fully implemented. This would even-
tually lead to the establishment of a common AGCC Market in the Arabian Gulf as
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well as establishing a common currency and exchange rate, which will not only
simplify business transactions throughout the AGCC but will stabilize the AGCC
basic monetary unit on the world market.
8. Human resources development has been the center of all other
development in the AGCC States, but there is still a lack of a skilled indigenous
labor force. Therefore, investment in human capital should be the objective and
the priority in all AGCC States. The large foreign force must be gradually
replaced with well-qualified nationals in both the public and private sectors.
Women should be encouraged to take up employment in suitable fields, such as
education, health and social work. The AGCC States have a youthful population.
40 percent is under 15 years of age. A large number of the indigenous work force
will enter the marketplace later this decade. Therefore, serious and careful
planning must take place now, to maximize utilization of the much needed
indigenous human resource.
9. Despite the enormous effort and achievement of the educational
system in the AGCC States, the educational and training systems need radical
reform. The educational system should be reengineered to put greater emphasis on
vocational education and training as well as on the sciences and technological
fields. We must understand technological education has become essential to meet
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modern day economic challenges and contributes successfully to national develop-
ment. The educational system should meet the demands of the modern economies
that the AGCC States are seeking to establish.
10. The Shura Councils (National Consultative Councils) in the AGCC
States have given the citizens of the AGCC States the opportunity to take part in
the decision making process in their countries. The Shura Councils are the most
suitable forms of political participation in the AGCC States, because they are
accepted by both the traditional and the liberal societies of the AGCC States.
However, this is only as the first step toward gradual political participation of the
AGCC citizens in the political system of their countries. For the future of the
AGCC, its success, and the political stability of its governments; the legislative
capacity of the Shura Councils should be expanded. The people of the AGCC
States must feel part of the effort.
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Being fully aware of their mutual bonds and special relations, common
characteristics and similar systems founded on the Creed of Islam; and based on
their faith in the common destiny and destination that link their peoples; and in view
of their desire to effect coordination, integration and cooperation among them in all
fields; and based on their conviction that coordination, cooperation and integration
among them serve the higher goals of the Arab nation; and in order to strengthen
their cooperation and reinforce their common links and in an endeavor to comple-
ment efforts already begun in all vital fields that concern their peoples and realize
their hopes in a better future on the path to unity of their states; and in conformity
with the Charter of the League ofArab States which calls for the realization of
closer relations and stronger bonds; and in order to channel their efforts to reinforce
and sense Arab and Islamic causes have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE ONE
Establishment of Council
A council shall be established hereby to be named "The Cooperation Council








The Council shall hold its meetings in the state where it has its headquarters,
and may convene in any member state.
ARTICLE FOUR
Objectives
The basic objectives of the Cooperation Council are:
1
.
To effect coordination, integration and cooperation between member
states in all fields in order to achieve unity among them.
2. To deepen and strengthen relations, links and scopes of cooperation
now prevailing between their peoples in various fields.
3. To formulate similar regulations in various fields including the
following:
a. Economics and Finance,
b. Commerce, customs and communications,
c. Education and culture,
d. Social and health affairs,
e. Information and tourism,
f. Legislation and administrative affairs.
To stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry,
mineralogy, agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research
centers; to implement common projects, and to encourage cooperation by the private




The Cooperation Council shall be formed of the six states that participated
in the Foreign Ministers' meeting held at Riyadh on February 4. 198 1
.
ARTICLE SIX
Structures of the Cooperation Council
The Cooperation Council shall have the following main structures:
1
.





Each of these structures may establish branch organs as necessary.
ARTICLE SEVEN
Supreme Council
1. The Supreme Council is the highest authority of the Cooperation
Council and shall be formed ofheads ofmember states. Its presi-
dency shall rotate alphabetically according to the names of the
member states.
2. The Supreme Council shall hold one regular session every year.
Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the request of any
member seconded by another member.
3. The Supreme Council shall hold its sessions in the territory of
member states.
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4. A Supreme Council meeting shall be considered valid if attended by
two thirds of the member states.
ARTICLE EIGHT
Supreme Council's Functions
The Supreme Council shall endeavor to achieve the objectives of the
Cooperation Council, particularly concerning the following:
1
.
Review matters of interest to the member states.
2. Lay down the higher policy for the Cooperation Council and the basic
lines it should follow.
3. Review the recommendations, reports, studies and common projects
submitted by the Ministerial Council for approval.
4. Review reports and studies which the Secretary-General is charged to
prepare.
5. Approve the bases for dealing with other states and international
organizations.
6. Approve the rules of procedure of the Commission for Settlement of
Disputes and nominate its members.
7. Appoint the Secretary-General.
8. Amend the Charter of the Cooperation Council.
9. Approve the Council's Internal Rules.
10. Approve the budget of the Secretariat-General.
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ARTICLE NINE
Voting in Supreme Council
1 . Each member of the Supreme Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be
carried by unanimous approval of the member states participating in
the voting, while resolutions on procedural matters shall be carried by
a majority vote.
ARTICLE TEN
Commission for Settlement of Disputes
1
.
The Cooperation Council shall have a commission called "Commis-
sion for Settlement of Disputes," which shall be attached to the
Supreme Council.
2. The Supreme Council shall form the Commission for every case
separately based on the nature of the dispute.
3. If a dispute arises over interpretation or implementation of the
Charter and such dispute is not resolved within the ministerial
Council or the Supreme Council, the Supreme Council may refer
such dispute to the Commission for Settlement of Disputes.
4. The Commission shall submit its recommendations or opinion, as
applicable, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
ARTICLE ELEVEN
Ministerial Council
1 . The Ministerial Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers of the
member states or other delegated Ministers. The Council's presi-
dency shall rotate among members every three months by alphabe-
tical order of the states.
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2. The Ministerial Council shall convene every three months and may
hold extraordinary sessions at the invitation of any member seconded
by another member.
3. The Ministerial Council shall decide the venue of its next session.
4. A Council's meeting shall be deemed valid if attended by two thirds
of the member states.
ARTICLE TWELVE
Functions of the Ministerial Council
The Ministerial Council's functions shall include the following:
1
.
Propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects
aimed at developing cooperation and coordination among member
states in the various fields and adopt required resolutions or appropri-
ate recommendations.
2. Endeavor to encourage, develop and coordinate activities between
member states in all fields. Resolutions adopted in such matters shall
be referred to the Ministerial Council for further submission, with
recommendations, to the Supreme Council for appropriate action.
3. Submit recommendations to the Ministers concerned to formulate
policies whereby the Cooperation Council's resolutions may be put
into action.
4. Encourage means of cooperation and coordination between the
various private sector activities, develop cooperation between the
member states' chambers of commerce and industry, and encourage
flow ofworking citizens of the member states among them.
5. Refer any of the various facets of cooperation to one or more
technical or specialized committees for study and presentation of
relevant proposals.
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6. Review proposals related to amendments to this Charter and submit
appropriate recommendations to the Supreme Council.
7. Approve the Ministerial Council's Rules of Procedure as well as the
Rules of Procedure of the Secretariat-General.
8. Appoint the Assistant Secretaries-General, as nominated by the
Secretary-General, for a renewable period of three years.
9. Approve periodic reports as well as internal rules and regulations
related to administrative and financial affairs proposed by the
Secretary General, and submit recommendations to the Supreme
Council for approval of the budget of the Secretariat-General.




Review matters referred to it by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN
Voting in Ministerial Council
1. Every member of the Ministerial Council shall have one vote.
2. Resolutions of the Ministerial Council on substantive matters shall be
carried by a unanimous vote of the member states present and voting,





The Secretariat-General shall be composed of a Secretary-General
who shall be assisted by deputies and a number of staff as required.
2. The Supreme Council shall appoint the Secretary-General, who shall
be a citizen of one of the Cooperation Council states, for a period of
three years which may be renewed for one time only.
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3. The Secretary-General shall nominate the assistant secretaries-
general.
4. The Secretary-General shall appoint the Secretariat-General's staff
from among the citizens ofmember states and may not make
exceptions with the approval of the Ministerial Council.
5. The Secretary-General shall be directly responsible for the work of
the Secretariat General and the smooth flow ofwork in its various
organizations. He shall represent the Cooperation Council with other
parties within the powers vested in him.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN
Functions of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall undertake the following functions:
1
.
Prepare studies related to cooperation and coordination, integration
and programs for member states' common action.
2. Prepare periodic reports on the Cooperation Council's work.
3. Follow up the implementation by the member states of the resolutions
and recommendations of the Supreme Council and Ministerial
Council.
4. Prepare reports and studies ordered by the Supreme Council or
Ministerial Council.
5. Prepare the draft of administrative and financial regulations commen-
surate with the growth of the Cooperation Council and its expanding
responsibilities.
6. Prepare the Cooperation Council's budgets and accounts.
7. Make preparations for meetings, prepare agendas and draft resolu-
tions for the Ministerial Council.
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8. Recommend to the Chairman of the Ministerial Council the
convening of extraordinary sessions of the Council whenever
necessary.
9. Perform any other tasks entrusted to it by the Supreme Council or
Ministerial Council.
ARTICLE SIXTEEN
The Secretary-General, the assistant secretaries-general and all members of
the Secretariat-General's staff shall carry out their duties in complete independence
and for the common interest of the member states.
They shall refrain from any action or behavior that is incompatible with their






The Cooperation Council and its organizations shall enjoy on the
territories of all member states such legal competence, privileges and
immunities as required to realize their objectives and carry out their
functions.
2. Representatives of the member states on the Council and the
Council's employees, shall enjoy such privileges and immunities as
are specified in agreements to be concluded for this purpose among
the member states.
A special agreement shall organize the relations between the Council
and the state in which it has its headquarters.
3. Until such time as the two agreements mentioned in item 2 above are
prepared and put into effect, the representatives of the member states
in the Cooperation Council and its staff shall enjoy the diplomatic
privileges and immunities established for similar organizations.
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ARTICLE EIGHTEEN
Budget of the Secretariat-General
The Secretariat-General shall have a budget to which the member states





This Charter shall go into effect as of the date it is signed by the
heads of the six member states named in this Charter's Preamble.
2. The original copy of this Charter shall be deposited with Saudi
Arabia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall deliver a true copy
thereof to every member state pending the establishment of the
Secretariat-General at which time the latter shall become depository.
ARTICLE TWENTY
Amendments to Charter
1 Any member state may request an amendment to this Charter.
2. Requests for Charter amendments shall be submitted to the
Secretary-General who shall refer them to the member states at least
four months prior to submission to the Ministerial Council.
3. An amendment shall become effective if it is approved unanimously
by the Supreme Council.
ARTICLE TWENTY-ONE
Closing Provisions
No reservations may be voiced with respect to the provisions of this Charter.
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ARTICLE TWENTY-TWO
The Secretariat-General shall arrange to deposit and register copies of this
Charter with the League ofArab States and the United Nations, by resolution of the
Ministerial Council.
This Charter is signed on one copy in Arabic at Abu Dhabi City, United
Arab Emirates, on 21 Rajab 1401 corresponding to May 25, 1981.
United Arab Emirates
State of Bahrain






APPENDIX B. THE UNIFIED ECONOMIC AGREEMENT
With the help of God the Almighty;
The Governments of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council; in
accordance with the Charter thereof, which calls for closer cooperation and stronger
links; and, desiring to promote, expand and enhance their economic ties on solid
foundations, in the best interest of their peoples; and, intending to coordinate and
unify their economic, financial and monetary policies, as well as their commercial




a. The member states shall permit the importation and exportation
among each other of agricultural, animal, industrial and natural
resource products that are of national origin.
b. All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that





All agricultural, animal, industrial and natural resource products that
are of national origin shall be exempted from customs duties and
other charges having equivalent effect.
2. Fees charged for specific services such as demurrage, storage, trans-
portation, haulage or unloading, shall not be considered as customs
duties when they are levied on domestic products.
ARTICLE 3
1 . For products of national origin to qualify as national products, the
value added ensuing from their production in members states shall
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not be less than 40% of their final value. In addition, the share of the
member states' citizens in the ownership of the producing plant shall
not be less than 51%.
2. Every item to be exempted hereby shall be accompanied by a certifi-





Member states shall establish a uniform minimum customs tariff
applicable to the products of third countries.
2. One of the objectives of the uniform customs tariff shall be the
protection of national products from foreign competition.
3 The uniform customs tariff shall be applied gradually within five
years from the date of entry into force of this agreement. Arrange-
ments for the gradual application shall be agreed upon within one
year from the said date.
ARTICLE 5
Member states shall grant all facilities for the transit of any member state's
goods to other member states, exempting them from any duties and taxes, whatso-
ever, without prejudice to the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 2.
ARTICLE 6
Transit shall be denied to any goods that are barred from entry into the
territory of a member state by its local regulations. Lists of such goods shall be ex-
changed between the customs authorities of the member states.
ARTICLE 7
Member states shall coordinate their commercial policies and relations with
other states and regional economic groupings and blocs with a view toward creating
balanced trade relations and favorable circumstances and terms of trade.
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Coordinate export/import policies and regulations.
2. Coordinate policies for building up strategic food stocks.
3. Conclude economic agreements collectively when and if the common
benefit of the member states is realized.
4. Work for the creation of a collective negotiating force to strengthen
their negotiating position via-a-vis foreign parties in the field of
importation of basic needs and exportation of major products.
CHAPTER TWO
MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL, CITIZENS AND
EXERCISE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
ARTICLE 8
The member states shall agree on the executive rules which would ensure
that each member state shall grant the citizens of all other member the same treat-
ment granted to its own citizens without any discrimination or differentiation in the
following fields:
1 Freedom of movement, work and residence.
2. Right of ownership, inheritance and bequest.
3. Freedom of exercising economic activity.
4. Free movement of capital.
ARTICLE 9
The member states shall encourage their respective private sectors to






The member states shall endeavor to achieve coordination and harmony





The member states shall endeavor to coordinate their policies with
regard to all aspects of the oil industry including extraction, refining,
marketing, processing, pricing, exploitation of natural gas, and
development of energy sources.
2. The member states shall endeavor to formulate unified oil policies
and adopt common positions via-a-vis outside world, and in the
international specialized organizations.
ARTICLE 12
To achieve the objectives specified in this Agreement the member states
shall perform the following:
1 Coordinate industrial activities, formulate policies and mechanisms
aiming at the industrial development and the diversification of their
productive bases and on integrated basis.
2. Standardize their industrial legislation and regulations and guide their
local production units to meet their needs.
3. Allocate industries among member states according to relative
advantages and economic feasibility, and encourage the establishment
of basic as well as ancillary industries.
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ARTICLE 13
Within the framework of coordination, the member states shall pay special
attention to the establishment ofjoint ventures in the fields of industry, agriculture
and services, and shall support them with public, private or mixed capital in order to





The member states shall collaborate in finding spheres for common technical
cooperation aimed at building a genuine local base founded on encouragement and
support ofresearch and applied sciences and technology as well as adapting
imported technology to meet the region's progress and development objectives.
ARTICLE 15
Member states shall set rules, make arrangements and lay down terms for
the transfer oftechnology, selecting the most suitable or introducing such changes
thereto as would serve their various needs. Member states shall also, whenever
feasible, conclude uniform agreements with foreign governments and scientific or
commercial firms to achieve these objectives.
ARTICLE 16
The member states shall formulate policies and implement coordinated
programs for technical, vocational and professional training and rehabilitation at all
levels and stages. They shall also upgrade educational curricula at all levels to link
education and technology with the development needs of the member states.
ARTICLE 17
The member states shall coordinate their manpower policies and shall
formulate uniform and standardized criteria and classification for the various
categories of occupations and crafts in different sectors in order to avoid harmful
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The member states shall accord means for passenger and cargo transporta-
tion belonging to citizens of the other member states, when transiting or entering
their territory, the same treatment they accord to the means ofpassenger and cargo
transportation belong to their own citizens, including exemption from all duties and




The member states shall cooperate in the fields of land and sea
transportation, and communications. They shall also coordinate and
establish infrastructure projects such as seaports, airports, water and
power stations, roads, with a view to realizing common economic
development and linking their economic activities with each other.
2. The member states shall coordinate aviation and air transport policies
among them and promote all spheres ofjoint activities at various
levels.
ARTICLE 20
The member states shall allow steamers, ships and boats and their cargoes,
belonging to any member state to freely use the various port facilities and grant
them the same treatment and privileges granted to their own in docking or calling at
the ports as concerns fees, pilotage, and docking services, haulage, loading and
unloading, maintenance, repair, storage of goods and other similar services.
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CHAPTER SIX
FINANCIAL AND MONETARY COOPERATION
ARTICLE 21
The member states shall seek to unify investment in order to achieve a
common investment policy aimed at directing their internal and external
investments towards serving their interest, and realizing their peoples' aspirations in
develop-ment and progress.
ARTICLE 22
The member states shall seek to coordinate their financial, monetary
agencies and central banks, including an endeavor to establish a common currency
in order to further their desired economic integration.
ARTICLE 23
Member states shall seek to coordinate their external policies in the sphere




In the execution of the Agreement and determination of the procedures
resulting therefrom, consideration shall be given to differences in the levels of
development between the member states and the local development priorities of
each. Any member state may be temporarily exempted from applying such
provisions of this Agreement as may be necessitated by temporary local situations in
that state or specific circumstances faced by it. Such exemption shall be for a




No member state shall give to any non-member state any preferential
privilege exceeding that given herein.
ARTICLE 26
a. This Agreement shall enter into force four months after its approval
by the Supreme Council.
b. This Agreement may be amended by consent from the Supreme
Council.
ARTICLE 27
In case of conflict with local laws and regulations ofmember states, execu-
tion of the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.
ARTICLE 28
Provisions herein shall supersede any similar provisions contained in
bilateral agreements.
Drawn up at Riyadh on 6 Sha'ban 1401 Corresponding to June 8, 1981.
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